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SUMMARY
Botnets represent one of the most serious threats against Internet security since
they serve as platforms that are responsible for the vast majority of large-scale and
coordinated cyber attacks, such as distributed denial of service, spamming, and in-
formation stolen. Detecting botnets is therefore of great importance and a number
of network-based botnet detection systems have been proposed. However, as botnets
perform attacks in an increasingly stealthy way and the volume of network traffic
is rapidly growing, existing botnet detection systems are faced with significant chal-
lenges in terms of effectiveness and scalability.
The objective of this dissertation is to build novel network-based solutions that
can boost both the effectiveness of existing botnet detection systems by detecting
botnets whose attacks are very hard to be observed in network traffic, and their
scalability by adaptively sampling network packets that are likely to be generated by
botnets. To be specific, this dissertation describes three unique contributions.
First, we built a new system to detect drive-by download attacks, which represent
one of the most significant and popular methods for botnet infection. The goal of our
system is to boost the effectiveness of existing drive-by download detection systems
by detecting a large number of drive-by download attacks that are missed by these
existing detection efforts.
Second, we built a new system to detect botnets with peer-to-peer (P2P) com-
mand&control (C&C) structures (i.e., P2P botnets), where P2P C&Cs represent cur-
rently the most robust C&C structures against disruption efforts. Our system aims
to boost the effectiveness of existing P2P botnet detection by detecting P2P botnets
xiii
in two challenging scenarios: i) botnets perform stealthy attacks that are extremely
hard to be observed in the network traffic; ii) bot-infected hosts are also running
legitimate P2P applications (e.g., Bittorrent and Skype).
Finally, we built a novel traffic analysis framework to boost the scalability of exist-
ing botnet detection systems. Our framework can effectively and efficiently identify a
small percentage of hosts that are likely to be bots, and then forward network traffic
associated with these hosts to existing detection systems for fine-grained analysis,
thereby boosting the scalability of existing detection systems. Our traffic analysis
framework includes a novel botnet-aware and adaptive packet sampling algorithm,





A botnet is defined as a collection of bot-infected computers (a.k.a bots) that are re-
motely controlled by an attacker (a.k.a botmaster) via a command and control (C&C)
channel in order to commit a variety of malicious activities [36]. Botnets can serve as
platforms capable of launching various large-scale and coordinated cyber attacks such
as spamming [39], distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [4], phishing [28], click
fraud [64, 62, 21], search engine abuse [44, 43], and information theft [17]. Dating
back to 2007, Vint Cerf, who is recognized as one of fathers of Internet, estimated
that up to a quarter of all computers are part of botnets [61]. The following five years
unfortunately have experienced an aggravation of the botnet threat. On the one hand,
botnets grow fast in terms of both population and diversity, and they have started
to contaminate emerging infrastructures such as as smart phones [24] and industrial
control systems [63]. On the other hand, botnets become increasingly stealthy and
robust, introducing great challenges against detection and disruption efforts. As a
consequence, botnets have been recognized as one of the most serious threats against
Internet security and even national security.
It is therefore imperative to detect, mitigate, and prevent botnets. Building botnet
detection systems is of fundamental importance since it serves as an indispensable
step for further mitigation and prevention actions. Network-based botnet detection
systems are particularly desired due to their visibility of network behaviors of all
hosts in monitored networks and their tamper-resistant nature as a result of complete
system-level isolation from bot-infected hosts. In order to detect botnets, we divide
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the life cycle of a botnet into two critical phases according to its definition, namely
the infection phase and the control phase.
1.1.1 The Infection Phase of Botnets
The infection phase is referred to as the phase in which a clean host is infected by a
bot binary and then becomes a member of a botnet.
A variety of approaches could be used by attackers for botnet infection. Among
them, the scanning-and-exploiting approach has been used for decades, from tradi-
tional worm propagation [75] in the 1980s to recent IRC-based bot propagation [59]
and Conficker bot propagation [67]. In a scanning-and-exploiting attack, an attacker
compromises a victim host by first initiating a network connection to a vulnerable
service on that host and then injecting malicious content through the established
connection in order to exploit that service. A successful exploitation can lead to the
delivery a bot binary to the victim host, and such binary will subvert the host and
turn it into a member of a botnet. The scanning-and-exploit approach has enabled
astonishing success in worm propagation: in July of 2001, Code-Red worm propa-
gated to more than 359,000 computers in less than 14 hours. Approximately ten
years have passed, such infection approach is still used and still function as an im-
portant approach for botnet infection: a recent study of global scanning events [96]
indicated that many botnets still adopt the scanning-and-exploiting approach for in-
fection. However, the scanning-and-exploiting approach has an intrinsic drawback:
an attacker or a bot needs to initiate and establish a network connection to the victim
host so that exploit content could be delivered. As operating system vendors tend
to disable unnecessary services in their operating systems and network operators are
inclined to stop network connections initiated from uninvited hosts by using firewalls,
the scanning-and-exploiting approach gradually loses its effectiveness. This motivates
attackers to look for powerful alternatives for bot infection.
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Spam-based infection serves as an optional solution. In a spam-based infection at-
tempt, an attacker can send a spam email , which encloses bot binary, to a victim user
and then attract the user to install the binary. While such approach seems promis-
ing given the popularity of email service, its effectiveness is significantly constrained
because of the widely deployed spam detection systems [13, 71, 92], and especially its
dependence of victim users’ interaction (i.e., users have to install the bot binary).
With the advent of web 2.0, web browsers become the dominating network ap-
plications, and thus leveraging web browsers for bot infection attracts great endeav-
ors from attackers. Web-based malware infection approaches can be generally cat-
egorized into two classes, namely social-engineering-based infection approaches and
drive-by download attacks [11]. Similar to spam-based infection attacks discussed
above, social-engineering-based attacks require victim users’ interaction. A typical
social-engineering-based attack is the rogue security software attack [57]. In such at-
tacks, using security software (e.g., anti-virus tools) as camouflage, attackers host bot
binaries in a website and attract innocent users to install them. While the dependence
of users’ interaction may hinder the effectiveness of social-engineering-based attacks,
drive-by download attacks, on the contrary, take action without users’ consent. In
a drive-by download attack, an attacker embeds malicious content in the webpage
visited by a client browser. When the vulnerable browser renders the webpage, the
malicious content will attempt to exploit the vulnerability in the browser, which is
usually introduced by poorly designed but unfortunately widely used plugins. A suc-
cessful exploit causes the bot executable to be downloaded and executed, turning
the victim host into a bot. The popularity of web browsers, the widely used vul-
nerable plugins on various browsers, and the independence of users’ consent enable
the unparalleled significance of drive-by download attacks. For example, the most
notorious botnets such as Zeus [7] and Torpig [17] have used drive-by downloads for




Figure 1: An example of a centralized botnet
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Figure 2: An example of a P2P botnet
the primary way for malware infection [8].
1.1.2 The Control Phase of Botnets
The control phase is referred to as the phase in which bot-infected hosts are controlled
and coordinated by botmasters to launch cyber attacks.
In the control phase, botmasters rely on command&control (C&C) channels to
control and coordinate their bots. Different structures could be used by botmasters
to build C&C channels, such as centralized structures, namely centralized botnets,
and peer-to-peer structures, namely P2P botnets. As illustrated in Figure 1, bots
in a centralized botnet contact a single C&C server in order to fetch commands and
report information back. Centralized C&Cs have been widely used mainly due to
its simplicity. However, centralized C&Cs structures suffer from the single-point-of-
failure problem, where the whole botnet will be disrupted if the central C&C server
4
is taken down.
In order to overcome such limitation, botmasters recently use P2P structures to
organize their bots. As illustrated in Figure 2, all bots in a P2P botnet form a P2P
network, and each bot can serve as a client and a server. The botmaster can inject a
command into the P2P network and other bots will seek the command and execute
it. Without central C&C servers, P2P botnets offer great resilience, since even if
a significant portion of a P2P botnet is taken down the remaining bots may still
be able to communicate with each other and with the botmaster. Modern botnets
have started to use P2P C&Cs. Notable examples of P2P botnets are represented
by Nugache [68], Storm [66], Waledac [37], and even Confiker [67], which has been
shown to embed P2P capabilities.
1.1.3 Existing Botnet Detection Approaches
Detecting botnets in the infection phase is crucial, since it can either protect clean
hosts from being compromised or prevent bot-infected hosts from engaging in ma-
licious activities at their early stage. BotHunter [35] is dedicated to detect bot in-
fection based on a pre-defined infection dialog model. Its current implementation
mainly leverages scanning-and-exploiting attacks. To be specific, it correlates the
“inbound scan”, “inbound exploit”, “binary download”, “C&C communication”, and
“outbound scanning”. Since drive-by download attacks have dominated scanning-
and-exploiting attacks, BotHunter may expand its detection capability by extending
the infection dialog model in order to cover drive-by download attacks. A natural
way is to incorporate a new event that indicates a connection to a website used for
the drive-by download attack. Such websites, which are used for drive-by downloads,
could be identified by drive-by download detection systems. Drive-by download de-
tection systems could not only enhance BotHunter, but also help network operators or
search engines to block those websites used for drive-by download attacks to prevent
5
bot infection caused by these websites. Therefore, building drive-by download detec-
tion systems is very important. A number of drive-by download detection systems
have been proposed [11, 41, 51, 56, 91]. These systems share the same characteristic:
relying on exploit content or bot binaries presented to browsers for detection.
Although detecting botnets in their infection phase is vital, it is not sufficient.
A major reason is that infection activities could be carried out beyond the visibility
of deployed network-based detection systems. For example, a computer could be
infected by a bot binary from a physically connected USB stick, thereby not arousing
any malicious network traffic. As a consequence, building botnet detection systems
focusing on botnets’ control phase becomes necessary. Since C&Cs are essential for
botnets, current detection systems detect C&C channels in network traffic. So far, a
few botnet detection systems have been proposed. The representative ones include
BotSniffer [33], BotMiner [36], TĀMD [78], and Rishi [40]. These systems experience
either of the following two characteristics: i) performing deep packet inspection (DPI)
to analyze packet content, and ii) observing attacks initiated by botnets. For example,
Rishi [40], BotSniffer [33], and TĀMD [78] detect centralized botnet C&Cs in network
traffic by identifying synchronized network communications that share similar packet
payload. BotMiner [36] is capable of detecting both centralized and P2P botnets
by discovering groups of hosts that share both similar communication patterns and
similar attacks.
1.2 New Challenges
These proposed network-based detection systems, which can be used to detect botnets
in either the infection phase [35, 11, 41, 46, 51, 56, 91] or the control phase [40, 35,
33, 36], have shown promising detection performance. However, as both botnets and
the Internet are actively evolving, these detection systems are faced with two major
challenges: the stealthiness of botnets’ attacks and the huge volume of network traffic.
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First, in reaction to the intensive growth of law enforcement on punishing cyber
crimes, botmasters tend to instruct their botnets to perform attacks in an increasingly
stealthy way for evading detection. Such stealthy attacks arouse little anomaly and
thus become extremely hard to be observed in the network traffic. Take drive-by
download attacks as an example, in order to evade detection, attackers could attempt
to identify the existence of detection systems first and only deliver exploits and bot
executables to hosts that are unlikely to be detectors. As demonstrated in a case study
in [47], approximately 56% drive-by download attacks were missed by the existing
state-of-the-art detection methods. Additionally, recent study [94] has confirmed
that botnets have started to leverage popular email services to send spams, instead
of directly sending spams from bot-infected computers. To be specific, a botmaster
instructs his/her bots to sign in popular email service (e.g., Hotmail) using hijacked
accounts and then send spams through the email service. Such malicious intentions,
including signing in and then sending email to popular email service, are very hard
to be observed in the monitored networks. Consequently, existing botnet detection
systems may fail. For example, systems including [11, 41, 46, 51, 56, 91] could fail to
detect a huge number of drive-by download attempts due to the absence of exploits
and bot executables. Without observing attacks, BotMiner [36] also lacks evidence
to perform correlation between communication patterns and attack patterns.
Second, as the population of networked computers and devices is huge and keeps
exploding, the volume of network traffic is high and grows fast. Such huge volume
of traffic demands great scalability for network-based detection systems, meaning
that the detection systems need to process a large volume of network traffic effi-
ciently. However, as most of existing botnet detection systems [40, 33, 78, 36] rely
on deep packet inspection (DPI) to analyze packet content, which is computation-
ally expensive, their scalability is significantly constrained. As a consequence, when
these detection systems are deployed in high-speed or high-volume networks, they
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may not be able to afford to perform detailed analysis for all network traffic related
to bot-infected hosts and thus fail to detect bots.
To summarize, existing network-based botnet detection systems may fail to detect
botnets, which represent one of the most serious threats against Internet security, as
a result of two practical challenges. First, their effectiveness is significantly limited
due to botnets’ stealthy attacks, which are very hard to be observed in network
traffic. Second, their scalability is greatly constrained due to their dependence of
deep packet inspection compounded with the fast growing volume of network traffic.
New network-based botnet detection systems are therefore needed to address these
challenges.
1.3 Dissertation Overview
The objective of this dissertation is to build effective and scalable network-based
botnet detection systems. The dissertation presents network-based solutions that
can boost both the effectiveness of existing botnet detection systems by
detecting botnets whose attacks are very hard to be observed in network
traffic, and their scalability by adaptively sampling network packets that
are likely to be generated by botnets . To be specific, this dissertation describes
three unique contributions.
First, we built a new system to detect botnets in their infection phase. To be
specific, we designed a system [47] to detect drive-by download attacks, which rep-
resent one of the most significant and popular methods for botnet infection. The
goal of our system is to boost the effectiveness of existing drive-by download detection
systems by detecting a large number of stealthy drive-by download attacks that are
missed by these existing detection efforts. In order to accomplish this goal, our sys-
tem bootstraps from a set of drive-by download attacks detected by existing systems.
It then aggregates individual drive-by download attacks that result in the same bot
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executable into a malware distribution network (MDN). Our system further identifies
MDNs that have central servers, where a central server covers the vast majority of
drive-by download attacks in a MDN. Since central servers are stable and highly likely
to be used for malicious purposes, we generate regular expression signatures based on
URLs of central servers and then leverage the signatures for drive-by download detec-
tion. Experimental results based on an Internet-scale dataset have demonstrated that
our system can boost the number of drive-by download attacks by 96% while only
introducing an extremely low false positive rate (7.4 ∗ 10−5%). We also found that
our system can detect 93,488 drive-by download attacks in average 172 days earlier
than several popular public domain/IP reputation systems.
Second, we built a new system to detect botnets in their control phase. Partic-
ularly, we designed a system to detect botnets with peer-to-peer (P2P) C&C struc-
tures [48], where P2P C&C structures represent currently the most robust C&C
structures against disruption efforts. The goal of our system is to boost the effec-
tiveness of existing P2P botnet detection by detecting P2P botnets in two challenging
scenarios: i) botnets perform malicious activities in a stealthy way and thus their
malicious activities are extremely hard to be observed; ii) bot-infected hosts are also
running legitimate P2P applications (e.g., Bittorrent and Skype). In order to fulfill
this goal, our system first identifies all hosts engaging in P2P communications in the
networks (a.k.a, P2P clients), no matter they are legitimate P2P applications or P2P
bots. Our system further extracts fingerprint clusters to profile P2P clients. Based on
the obtained fingerprint clusters, our system finally identifies as a botnet a group of
P2P clients that are persistently active on the underlying hosts and at the same time
participate in coordinated search behaviors. Experimental results based on real-world
network traces have demonstrated that our system can achieve high detection rate
(100%) and low false positive rate (0.2%).
Finally, we built a novel traffic analysis framework to facilitate the deployment
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of existing botnet detection systems in high-speed and high-volume networks. As we
have discussed, the vast majority of botnet detection systems rely on deep packet
inspection (DPI). Since the DPI-based analysis is computationally expensive, these
systems may suffer from limited scalability on processing a large volume of traffic from
high-speed or high-volume networks. The goal of our work is to boost the scalability of
existing detection systems. In order to achieve this goal, we proposed a novel traffic
analysis framework. Our framework can effectively and efficiently identify a small
percentage of hosts that are likely to be bots, and then forward the network traffic
associated with these hosts to existing detection systems for fine-grained analysis,
thereby boosting the scalability of existing detection systems. Our traffic analysis
framework includes a novel botnet-aware and adaptive packet sampling algorithm and
a scalable flow-correlation technique. The packet sampling algorithm is bot-aware so
that it can focus on capturing packets that are likely related to botnets; it is adap-
tive so that it can maintain the actual packet sampling rate close to a pre-defined
sampling rate. The flow-correlation technique identifies network communications ex-
periencing persistent similarity, which represents a typical behavior of botnet C&Cs.
Experimental results based on real-world network traffic demonstrated that our sys-
tem can enable existing detection systems to achieve good detection performance by
only inspecting a small percentage of network traffic (e.g., 5%).
1.4 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
1. In Chapter 2, we discuss the design of a new system to detect drive-by down-
load attacks. We present our survey on existing drive-by download detection
techniques and compare them to our system. We then elaborate on the design
of processing components, including identifying malware distribution networks
and generating regular expression signatures. The experimental evaluation in
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terms of detection rate, false positive rate, and early detection is finally dis-
cussed.
2. In Chapter 3, we discuss the design of our P2P botnet detection system. We
introduce the definition of fingerprint cluster, and present the clustering-based
algorithm to derive fingerprint clusters from network traffic. We also present
how to use fingerprint clusters to profile P2P applications. The features and
the algorithm used for isolating P2P bots from legitimate P2P applications are
also discussed. We subsequently present our evaluation results.
3. In Chapter 4, we describe our design of a traffic analysis framework aiming to
boost the scalability of existing botnet detection systems. The design of the bot-
aware packet sampling algorithm and the design of the scalable flow-correlation
are presented. The evaluation based on real-world dataset is presented, fol-
lowed by the comparison between our sampling algorithm and other sampling
algorithms.




DETECTING DRIVE-BY DOWNLOAD ATTACKS
2.1 Motivation
As discussed in Section 1.1, the life cycle of a botnet can be divided into two phases,
namely “infection phase” and “control phase”. Detecting botnets in the infection
phase is very important and useful since it can protect clean hosts from being infected
or prevent bot-infected hosts from performing malicious activities in their early state.
Various approaches could be used for bot infection. Among them, drive-by download
attacks become one of the most significant and popular approaches.
Drive-by download attacks are referred to as the download of malware through
vulnerable web browsers without users’ consent [11]. In drive-by download attacks,
attackers embed malicious content in either the original webpage visited by the user,
denoted as the landing page, or some content directly, or indirectly, referenced by
the landing page, which is usually hosted on a compromised web server. When a
web browser renders these webpages, the malicious content attempts to exploit the
vulnerability in the browser. A successful exploit attempt often causes malware to be
downloaded and executed, converting the underlying operating system to a malware-
infected victim such as a bot. Since drive-by download attacks take advantage of web
browsers, the most popular Internet applications, and do not require users’ interac-
tion, they have dominated the traditional scanning-and-exploit approaches [11], and
they have served as the primary way for malware infection [8, 65].
Multiple steps are usually involved in a drive-by download attack, as illustrated
in Figure 3. The malicious content embedded in the compromised webpage, which
is initially rendered by the browser, usually does not directly exploit the browser.
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Figure 3: Multiple steps in a drive-by download attack
Instead it redirects the browser to other redirection servers which either provide ex-
ternal webpage content or further redirect to additional servers. After visiting one
or more, possibly benign, redirection servers, the browser will eventually encounter
a malicious redirection server which further redirects to the servers that attempt to
exploit the browser and download malware. The malicious redirection server can be
used to manage the attacks and decide the exploit server to use, which has the best
matching set of exploits (e.g., IE exploits for IE browsers). A set of different drive-
by downloads can be managed by the same attacker for a particular purpose (e.g.,
distributing the same malware binary for a botnet) and therefore form a malware
distribution network (MDN). In this chapter, we define a MDN to be a collection
of drive-by downloads that serve the same malicious objective such as distributing
related malware executables.
Several methods [11, 41, 46, 51, 56, 91] have been proposed to detect drive-by
download attacks and are described in detail in Section 2.2. Most of these meth-
ods [11, 41, 51, 56, 91] rely on the malicious webpage content returned by servers used
for exploits or malware distribution to detect the attacks. For example, [11, 41, 56, 91]
require the exploit content whereas [51] needs the downloaded binary. These systems
may fail to detect a large number of drive-by download attacks (i.e. false negatives)
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Figure 4: An example of a malware distribution network
if no exploit is detected for several reasons. First, the attackers may be aware of IP
addresses of the detection systems. In this case, they can feed detection systems with
benign content. Additionally, the detectors may not be configured correctly to match
an attack. For example, the detector may present an unpatched version of Internet
Explorer, but the malicious landing page may target a FireFox vulnerability. Finally,
since the exploit and malware distribution servers may be hosted on compromised
servers, their stability will be affected by the network churn. So when the detection
system visits these servers, they may be temporally unavailable and thus no exploit
attempt occurs in the victim’s browser. Although incapable of detecting drive-by
download attacks, WebCop [46] (see Section 2.2 for details) can handle this prob-
lem since it is based on the URLs of exploit/malware-distribution servers. However,
the hostnames, IP addresses or the parameter values in the URLs can be frequently
changed to make WebCop ineffective since it matches the entire URL of the malicious
executable.
In this chapter, we will present a novel drive-by download detection system,
namely ARROW [47]. The objective of our method is to boost the effectiveness
of existing drive-by download detection systems by detecting a large number of drive-
by downloads that are missed by them. In order to achieve this objective, we leverage
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the URL information of the central servers in MDNs (See Section 2.3), where a central
server is a common server shared by a large percentage of drive-by download samples
in the same MDN. The example of an MDN with a central server is presented in
Figure 4, where “3b3.org” serves as a central server. A central server usually provides
certain critical information to make the drive-by download successful, and it is not
necessarily the server used for exploit attempts or malware distribution. For example,
it can be a redirection server used to optimize the MDN performance. A central server
can even be a legitimate server where certain information is retrieved to calculate the
location of the exploit servers dynamically, as presented in Section 2.4.3.3. To be
specific, our method bootstraps from the drive-by download samples detected using
existing methods, where we first aggregate drive-by download samples into MDNs
based on the malware (i.e., hash value) information or the URL of the exploit server.
For each MDN, we next discover the central servers if they exist. We further gener-
ate signatures in the form of regular expressions based on the URLs for the central
servers. These signatures can then be distributed to a search engine or browsers
to detect drive-by downloads. The lower half of Figure 5 illustrates our method.
These signatures can boost the detection coverage in three ways. First, if a drive-by
download attempt reaches the central server without hitting the servers for exploit
attempts or malware distribution, our signatures can still detect the attack. Second
for a drive-by download attempt, if there is only a URL request to the central server
without malicious webpage content returned, our signatures can still detect it since
the signatures are independent of the webpage content. Third, the signatures are in
the form of regular expressions, which can capture the structural patterns of a central
server’s URL and therefore outperform exact string matching used by WebCop.
We have implemented our method in a system named ARROW and validated
it using data generated from a large-scale production search engine. As presented
in the experimental results in Section 4.4, our method can significantly increase the
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detection coverage by 96%, with an extremely low false positive rate (7.4 ∗ 10−5%).
It can also detect tens of thousands of drive-by download attacks in average 172 days
compared to several popular public domain/IP reputation systems. In summary, we
made the following contributions:
1. We provide a method to identify malware distribution networks from millions
of individual drive-by download attacks.
2. By correlating drive-by download samples, we propose a novel method to gener-
ate regular expression signatures of central servers of MDNs to detect drive-by
downloads.
3. We build a system called ARROW to automatically generate regular expression
signatures of central servers of MDNs and evaluate the effectiveness of these
signatures.
2.2 Related Work
Since drive-by download attacks have served as the primary way for malware infection,
including bot infection, great efforts have been spent to analyze and detect web-
based malware attacks. Existing detection methods, summarized in Table 1, can be
categorized into 2 classes, namely top-down and bottom-up. The table also illustrates
how ARROW compares to prior work based on other features including whether the
detection examines the content or the URL of the webpage, uses the results of the
static or dynamic crawler, and correlates multiple instances of an attack.
The top-down approach for drive-by detection adopts a crawler-scanner based
architecture. For drive-by downloads, the crawler collects URLs by traversing the
dynamic web graphs in the forward direction, while in parallel, a scanner identifies
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Table 1: Comparison of different detection methods
Approach Page URL static dynamic Correlation of multiple
Content crawler crawler Drive-by Downloads
HoneyMonkey [91] X X
Crawler-Based Spyware Study [11] X X X
Capture-HPC [25, 27] X X
IFrame [65] X X
PhoneyC [41] X X
Malicious JavaScript Detection [56] X X X
Blade [51] X X
WebCop [46] X X
ARROW X X X
drive-by download attempts. The scanner could be a client honeypot using signa-
ture [26] and anomaly detection [25] methods. By rendering a URL, the scanner in-
vestigates the suspicious state change of the operating system or analyzes the webpage
to detect drive-by downloads. The first seven systems presented in Table 1 belong
to the top-down category. The upper-left part of Figure 5 presents the architecture
of HoneyMonkey as an example for the top-down approach. Most of the drive-by
download detection approaches [11, 27, 41, 51, 56, 65, 91] fall in the top-down cate-
gory. For example, a high-interaction client honeypot scanner [25] has been used to
dynamically execute the webpage content [11, 27, 91]. Provos et al. [65] also adopted
high-interaction client honeypots to conduct large-scale measurements of drive-by
downloads in the wild. Nazario [41] proposed a lightweight, low-interaction client
honeypot called PhoneyC to detect drive-by downloads by analyzing the webpage
content. Cova et al. [56] developed a machine learning-based detector to investigate
the JavaScript embedded in webpage content for drive-by download detection. Re-
cently, Lu et al. [51] designed a detector to identify drive-by downloads by correlating
user action and the binary downloading events. These approaches have shown promis-
ing results. However, their effectiveness is significantly limited by the availability of a
successful response with malicious content from a drive-by download attack. The lack
of a malicious response will make these approaches ineffective and thus may introduce
a large number of false negatives.
To deal with the limitations introduced by analyzing webpage content, Stokes et
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Figure 5: An illustration of existing drive-by download detection methods
al. [46] proposed a bottom-up based approach, called WebCop, to identify webpages
that host malicious binaries. WebCop takes two inputs, i) a set of URLs for malware
distribution sites that are contributed by a large number of anti-malware clients, and
ii) a static web graph. WebCop traverses the hyperlinks in the web graph in a reverse
direction to discover the malicious landing pages linking to the URLs for malware
distribution sites. In Figure 5, the upper-middle part illustrates the architecture of
WebCop. Nevertheless, WebCop has two limitations. First, WebCop uses an exact
match to discover the malware distribution sites in the web graph, which may easily
introduce false negatives especially when the parameter values are changed. Second,
the web graph is based on static hyperlinks, which limit the detection of WebCop. For
example, a malicious landing page may redirect the browser to the exploit server only
if its dynamic content (e.g., malicious JavaScript code) is executed in the browser.
Therefore, a static web graph has very limited visibility of the route from malicious
landing pages to the malware distribution sites.
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Provos et al. [65] proposed a method to discover malware distribution networks
from drive-by download samples. This method requires the parsing and matching
operation of the webpage headers (e.g., Referer) and content (e.g., JavaScript), which
is heavyweight. Furthermore, the attackers could potentially obfuscate the webpage
content to prevent their MDNs from being discovered. In contrast, ARROW identifies
MDNs by aggregating drive-by download samples into different groups according to
the malware hash values and URL information of exploit servers. Although this
method provides less information of MDNs for measurement purpose (e.g., the number
of redirection steps) compared to [65], it provides enough information for ARROW
to detect central servers. In particular, this approach is more efficient and robust,
which can identify more MDNs given a large number of drive-by download samples.
Automatic signature generation based on network information has been studied
in previous work [42, 70, 74, 87, 92, 97] and has been used to detect various attacks.
For example, most [42, 74, 87, 97] focus on worm fingerprinting. Perdisci et al. [70]
generate signatures to detect HTTP-based malware (e.g., bots). AutoRE [92] out-
puts regular expression signatures for spam detection. Compared to these methods,
ARROW mainly differentiates itself by detecting a different attack (a.k.a, drive-by
download). Although ARROW uses a similar approach to build keyword-based sig-
nature trees proposed by Xie et al. [92] to detect spams, it is customized for drive-by
download detection since drive-by downloads have different characteristics compared
to those of spams (e.g., “distributed” and “bursty”), which are critical to guide Au-
toRE to build the signature tree.
2.3 System
The architectural overview of ARROW is presented in Figure 6. The input of the
system is a set of HTTPTraces, which will be described in Section 2.3.1, and the
output is a set of regular expression signatures identifying central servers of MDNs.
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Figure 6: The system architecture
ARROW has three major processing components. The first component, Hostname-
IP Mapping, discovers groups of hostnames that are closely related by sharing a large
percentage of IP addresses. The second component, central server identification, ag-
gregates individual drive-by download samples which form MDNs and then identifies
the central servers. For an MDN with one or more central servers, the third compo-
nent generates regular expression signatures based on the URLs and also conducts
signature pruning. The following sections elaborate on each component.
2.3.1 HTTPTraces
HTTPTraces are initially collected from a cluster of high-interaction client honey-
pots, and an HTTPTrace example is presented in Table 2. Each honeypot visits the
URL of the landing page and executes all of the dynamic content (e.g., JavaScript).
By detecting state changes in the browser and the underlying operating system and
file system, a honeypot can identify whether the landing page is suspicious. The sus-
picious landing page and other URLs consequently visited are recorded. If any exploit
content is detected on a webpage, the crawler will also record its corresponding URL
in “exploitURLs”. Otherwise “exploitURLs” is set to be empty. Simply visiting a
webpage with no user interaction should never cause an executable to be written to
the file system. If the high-interaction client honeypot detects that an executable
is written to disk, the file’s hash value (e.g. SHA1) is stored in “bHash”. The IP
address corresponding to the hostname involved in each URL is also recorded. Ei-
ther the non-empty “exploitURLs” or the non-empty “bHash” implies that a drive-by
download attack has been successfully launched and detected, where “isDriveBySucc”
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is set as TRUE. Otherwise, “isDriveBySucc” is set as FALSE. It should be noted that
“isDriveBySucc=FALSE” may indicate a false negative. For example, the exploit con-
tent is hosted in a compromised server and is temporally unavailable at the moment
of detection. Although “isDriveBySucc” is set to be FALSE in this case, this exploit
webpage is still considered to be harmful to other users.
2.3.2 Hostname-IP Mapping
We typically use a hostname or an IP address to represent a server. However, attackers
can introduce great diversity of hostnames and IP addresses for an individual server.
On one hand, IP addresses may exhibit great diversity due to fast-flux techniques [80,
85], where one hostname can be resolved to a large number of IP addresses. In
this case, using the IP address to represent one server decreases the possibility of
identifying central servers that share the same hostname but distribute to different
IP addresses. On the other hand, attackers can register a number of hostnames (and
thus domain names) and resolve them to one or a small pool of IP addresses. In this
case, if we use a hostname to represent one server, we may fail to identify central
servers with the same IP address but different hostnames.
In order to eliminate the diversity introduced by hostnames and IP addresses for
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Figure 7: Hostname-IP mapping
representing a server, we design a data structure named Hostname-IP Cluster
(HIC) to represent a group of hostnames that share a large percentage of IPs. A
similar technique [69] was proposed to discover fast-flux networks. Each HIC has
a set of hostnames and a set of IP addresses, denoted as HIC = {SHost, SIP}. We
follow the steps below to discover HICs:
1 As the initialization phase, for each hostname (hi) we have observed
in the HTTPTraces, we identify all of the IP addresses resolved for hi
(IP1, IP2, . . . , IPn). We initiate one HICi using HICi.SHost = {hi} and
HICi.SIP = {IP1, . . . , IPn}.
2 Suppose we have N Hostname-IP clusters, denoted as HIC1, . . . , HICN . For




overlap of the IP addresses of the two clusters. If rHIC > THIC , where THIC is a
pre-defined threshold and 0 ≤ THIC < 1, we first merge the second cluster into
the first cluster using HICi.SIP = HICi.SIP ∪ HICj.SIP and HICi.SHost =
HICi.SHost ∪ HICj.SHost and then discard HICj.
3 Repeat step 2 until no HICs are merged into other clusters.
THIC is a pre-defined threshold to determine whether two HICs should be merged
or not. A small value for THIC indicates a relaxed condition. For example, THIC = 0
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means that if two HICs share a single common IP, they are going to be merged
together. This may introduce significant noise in the merged HICs. A large value
of THIC enforces a strong condition for two HICs to be merged. For example, a
THIC value close to 1 requires that two HICs share almost the same IPs. This may
significantly decrease the possibility of merging more related HICs. In the current
system, we set THIC = 0.5.
Figure 7 gives an example of identifying Hostname-IP clusters, where Hostname1
and Hostname2 share 3 out of 4 IP addresses (rHIC = 75%) and are grouped in one
cluster. After identifying all the HICs, we use the index of each HIC to replace the
hostname in each URL. For instance as described in Figure 7, the URLs of hostname1/
t.php?s=1 and hostname2/t.php?s=2 will be represented as HIC1/t.php?s=1 and
HIC1/t.php?s=2. Therefore, instead of taking hostname1 and hostname2 as two
different servers, we use the HIC to discover their relationship and represent them
as a single server.
2.3.3 Identification of Central Servers
To identify the MDNs with one or more central servers, we need to first discover
MDNs from a set of HTTPTraces. In ARROW, we use the hash value of the malware
executable (“bHash”) and URLs of exploit webpages (“exploitURLs”) to aggregate
HTTPTraces into MDNs. On one hand, we group all HTTPTraces with the same
value of “bHash” into one MDN. It is possible that multiple organizations may install
the same malware causing the two groups’ MDNs to be merged. This should not be a
major problem for the following reason. For malware that is automatically generated
from a toolkit, a malicious executable is often customized for each attacker yielding
different executable hash values: these similar attacks will be grouped into separate
MDNs. On the other hand, for each URL in “exploitURLs”, we identify its corre-
sponding HIC and group all the HTTPTraces with same HIC index into one MDN.
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For each MDN, we do not consider the landing pages as candidate URLs for discov-
ering central servers, since they are usually compromised websites that are unlikely
to serve as central servers. Also, we do not consider the URLs of “exploitURL” as
candidate URLs; therefore, the identified central servers are likely used for redirection
purpose.
After we aggregate all of the HTTPTraces into different MDNs, we eliminate (i.e.
filter) the MDNs with a small number of HTTPTraces since small MDNs have a higher
likelihood of incorrectly identifying central servers. For example, an MDN with two
HTTPTraces may have a high probability of belonging to the same advertisement
network, and thus the benign, advertisement server will be incorrectly identified as
a central server in the MDN. Therefore ARROW only identifies MDNs containing
more than THTTPTrace drive-by download samples where THTTPTrace is currently set
as THTTPTrace = 20.
Then for each MDN, we identify the central servers as the nodes (represented
by an HIC index) that are contained in a majority of the HTTPTraces. Given an
MDN with K HTTPTraces where each trace contains a collection of URLs, we have
first replaced the hostname for each URL using its corresponding HIC. For each
HIC, we determine the count, C, of the number of HTTPTraces employing this
HIC. If rcen =
C
K
is greater than the pre-defined ratio Tcen, where 0 ≤ Tcen ≤ 1,
we take this HIC as a central server. We conservatively set Tcen with a large value
(currently Tcen = 0.9) to guarantee the “central” property of the central server. For
any two MDNs sharing one or more central servers, we merge them together into
a new MDN. The shared central servers are taken as the central servers for the
new MDNs, while the other central servers are discarded. This operation eliminates
redundant central servers without compromising their coverage, and thus reduces
the total number of signatures and consequently computationally expensive, regular
expression matching operations. Also by merging smaller MDNs, we increase the
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Figure 8: Discover MDNs and identify central servers
number of URLs corresponding to each central server, which helps to generate more
generic signatures. Figure 8 illustrates an example of discovering MDNs and central
servers. In Figure 8, S1, S2 and S3 are initially identified as central servers since most
of the HTTPTraces corresponding to “Malware1/2/3” (bHash1/2/3) contain S1/2/3.
The central server S1, which is shared by two MDNs, is ultimately identified as the
central server for the newly merged MDN. Although S2 is discarded, S1 still guarantees
its coverage of drive-by download samples in this MDN.
2.3.4 Regular Expression Generation
In this section, we discuss how to generate regular expressions corresponding to the
central servers in order to detect additional HTTPTraces exhibiting drive-by down-
load attempts. There are two straight forward approaches to using the central server
information to detect HTTPTraces of drive-by downloads. One option is to use the
network level information of central servers (i.e. hostname and IP address). For ex-
ample, if any URL in an HTTPTrace contains the hostname or IP address of any
25
central server, this HTTPTrace will be labeled as suspicious. However, this detection
approach is too coarse and may introduce a large number of false positives, especially
when the central server is benign such as the example described in Section 2.4.3.3.
Another option is to use exact string matching of URLs in the MDNs corresponding
to central servers. For example, if any URL in an HTTPTrace exactly matches any
of the URLs of central servers, this HTTPTrace will be labeled as suspicious. How-
ever, this approach is too specific resulting in a huge number of false negatives. For
example, a simple change in values for the parameters in the URL makes the exact
match fail. These examples provide motivation to design generic signatures that can
capture the invariant part of the URLs for central servers and also give an accurate
description of the dynamic portion of these URLs. Thus ARROW generates regular
expression signatures for each central server by investigating the structural patterns
of its corresponding URLs.
To generate regular expressions, ARROW follows two steps:
1. For each central server in a MDN, generate tokens out of all the URLs that are
contained in this MDN and corresponding to the central server, and then build
the signature tree according to the coverage of each token.
2. Identify the branches with high coverage, and then generate signatures in the
form of regular expressions.
These items are discussed in detail in the next two sections.
2.3.4.1 Token and Signature Tree Generation
Since URLs are well-structured strings, ARROW generates tokens based on the struc-
ture of each URL. ARROW collects tokens for the following 5 categories: the HIC
index, the name for each directory, the name of the file, the suffix of the file and the
name of the parameters. The information from the last four categories indicates the
information of the toolkit that attackers use to organize the MDNs. For example, the
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Figure 9: An example of a signature tree
name of the directory represents the directory or the sub-directory that organizes the
scripts. The suffix of a script, which implies the script language, is usually identical
in the same MDN for a script with the same functionality, even if the file names differ
from each other. Taking the 7 URLs in Figure 9 as an example, we find the set of
tokens as {HIC1,default,index,.php,?id=,&category=,upload,&class=,peer,
test,exploit,?vuln=,fig,script,image,src,bin,include,temp}.
We build the signature tree based on the approach introduced in [92]. We denote
the set of all URLs as Uall, and the set of URLs containing one token/node Ni as U
N
i .
The set of URLs covered by a particular branch B = {Nroot, N1 . . . Ni} is given by






1 · · · ∩ U
N
i . To build the tree, two operations are defined:
building the root node and building the child nodes. To build the root node, the
token with the largest coverage of the URLs is taken as the root (Nroot). To identify
the child node(s) for one node Ni in branch B = {Nroot, N1 . . . Ni}, we follow the two
steps below.
1. Let UBRest = U
B
i and Setnodes = {Nroot, N1 . . . Ni}.
2. If UBRest = ∅, exit. Otherwise, for each node Nj /∈ Setnodes, select the one
with maximum |UBRest ∩ U
N




j |) == 0,
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Setnodes = Setnodes ∪ Nk. Repeat Step 2.
Returning to Figure 9, an example of the signature corresponding to the 7 URLs is
presented. Since the HIC index, HIC1, is always contained in all of the URLs, we
take it as the root of the tree.
2.3.4.2 Signature Generation
For each branch in the signature tree, we obtain more specific patterns for a subset
of URLs as we approach the leaves. To learn the general pattern representing the
URLs, we define a node Ni as a critical-node if |U
N
i |/|Uall| ≥ R and none of its child
nodes satisfy this condition where the threshold 0 ≤ R ≤ 1. We name the branch
from the root to this critical-node as a critical-branch. In Algorithm 1 we describe
a method to identify each critical-node. We run this algorithm multiple times by
decreasing R until all the URLs are covered by the critical-nodes, which is described
in Algorithm 2. In our system, we initialize R = 0.3 and α = 0.9. For the signature
tree described in Figure 9, we identify the critical-nodes by following the steps below.
1. R = 0.3. Identify critical-node “&category=”.
2. R = 0.3 ∗ 0.9. Identify critical-nodes “&class=” and “?vuln=”.
After identifying the critical-nodes in the signature tree, we traverse the tree to find
the branches from the root to each critical-node. The nodes in one of these branches
composite one set of candidate tokens. For each token, we further investigate its
average distance from the beginning of the URLs. For one set of candidate tokens,
we sort the tokens according to the average distance and then obtain a sequence of
candidate tokens. For the example above, ARROW generates three sequences:
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Algorithm 1: IdentifyCriticalNode(curNode, R, N)
curNode: one Node in the tree.
R: the threshold (0 < R < 1).
N : N = |Uall|.




Boolean flag = true;
foreach Node oneNode in curNode.getChildNodes() do
if
|UBoneNode|





N ≥ R then
curNode.setCriticalNode();










R: the threshold (0 < R < 1).





while numRest > 0 do
IdentifyCirticalNode(rootNode, R, N);
R = R ∗ α;
end
1. seq1 = { HIC1,default,.php,?id=,&category= }
2. seq2 = { HIC1,default,.php,?id=,&class= }
3. seq3 = { HIC1,default,.php,exploit,?vuln= }
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Next, for each pair of consecutive tokens (and also for the last token and the end
of URLs), we investigate the following properties of the strings that reside between
them.
1. Are these strings identical?
2. The minimum and maximum length of the strings.
3. Are the characters in these strings lower or upper case?
4. Are the characters in these string letters or numbers?
5. Enumerate special characters (e.g., “.” and “?”) in these strings.
Finally, we summarize these properties in order to generate the regular expression. If
these strings are identical, we directly present such string in the regular expression.
Otherwise, we describe the properties in the regular expression format. For our
running example, we obtain the three regular expressions:
1. reg1 = HIC1/[a-z]{3,5}/default/[a-z]{5,6}.php?id=[0-9]{1}&category=[0-9]
{1}
2. reg2 = HIC1/[a-z]{3,3}/default/[a-z]{4}.php?id=[0-9]{1} &class=[0-9]{1}
3. reg3 = HIC1/[a-z]{4,7}/default/exploit.php?vuln=[0-9]{1}
We further refer to the hostnames and IP addresses in HIC1. We generate the
domain names for the hostnames and replace HIC1 using the domain names and
IP addresses to get the regular expression signatures. For example, if HIC1 =
{{cnt1.foo1.com, cnt2.foo1.com, cnt1.foo2.com}, {192.168.1.2, 192.168.1.4}}, we re-
place HIC1 using foo1.com, foo2.com, 192.168.1.2 and 192.168.1.4 for reg1,
reg2 and reg3. For example, reg3 will be extended to be four signatures:
1. reg3.1 = foo1.com/[a-z]{4,7}/default/exploit.php? vuln=[0-9]{1}
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2. reg3.2 = foo2.com/[a-z]{4,7}/default/exploit.php? vuln=[0-9]{1}
3. reg3.3 = 192.168.1.2/[a-z]{4,7}/default/exploit.php? vuln=[0-9]{1}
4. reg3.4 = 192.168.1.4/[a-z]{4,7}/default/exploit.php? vuln=[0-9]{1}.
It is possible that some signatures are prone to induce false positives during detec-
tion. For example, a signature may be too general corresponding to a legitimate do-
main name. To decrease the possibility of false positives, we apply signature pruning.
To be specific, we evaluate each signature using a large set of legitimate HTTPTraces,
where each HTTPTrace is associated with a high-reputation landing page. We discard
any signature successfully matching any URL in these legitimate HTTPTraces.
2.4 Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype system named ARROW, and evaluated it using a
large volume of HTTPTraces. The HTTPTraces, described in Section 2.3 and Table 2,
were collected by evaluating their landing pages using a production cluster of high-
interaction client honeypots. The following sections describe the experimental setup
and evaluation results.
2.4.1 Experimental Setup
Among all the HTTPTraces produced by the honeypot cluster, we randomly selected
a set of 3.5 billion HTTPTraces (Stotal) obtained from February and March of 2010.
Out of Stotal, 1, 345, 890 HTTPTraces (denoted as Smalicious) are identified as drive-by
download attacks. The remaining HTTPTraces are taken as the unlabeled dataset
(denoted as Sunlabeled). In order to obtain benign HTTPTraces for signature prun-
ing and evaluating false positives for popular landing pages, we use the following
approach. We first collect a list of 87k URLs with high reputation scores that were
recently confirmed by the analysts, where a high reputation score for a URL indi-
cates an extremely low probability that its webpages are associated with malicious
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Table 3: HTTPTraces for experiments






activities including drive-by download attacks, phishing, scamming, and spamming.
We then randomly divide this list into two sublists and collect HTTPTraces whose
landing pages contain one of these hostnames or URLs. The set of HTTPTraces cor-
responding to the first sublist (denoted as Sbenign1) is used for signature pruning. The
remaining HTTPTraces (denoted as Sbenign2), which correspond to the second sublist,
are used for false positive evaluation. Table 3 summarizes the number of HTTPTraces
included in each data set described above, indicating a large-scale evaluation of the
ARROW system.
The ARROW system applies regular expression signatures to match URLs in
HTTPTraces. Regular expression matching is naturally computationally expensive.
To speed up the matching process, we first aggregate the domain name and IP address
associated with each signature into a set. For a URL, only in case its domain name
or the corresponding IP address is contained (by a fast hash-based operation) in that
set, signature matching is applied. The matching process is further implemented
in a large-scale distributed computing infrastructure. Since the signatures will only
match on rare occasion, the computational overhead to match ARROW signatures is
negligible.
2.4.2 Experimental Design
We structured our experiments in four parts:
1. We compare the drive-by download attacks that are detected by ARROW sig-
natures to those (Smalicious) that are detected by existing detectors. Essentially
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we want to answer two questions: i) what is the coverage of ARROW signatures
on drive-by download attacks that are detected by existing detectors? ii) how
many new attacks can ARROW signatures detect?
2. Without knowing the ground truth for all benign HTTPTraces in our evalua-
tion dataset, false positives generated by ARROW signatures become a major
concern. Since it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to enumerate all benign
samples among 3.5 billion HTTPTraces, we instead leverage several popular
public domain/IP reputation systems to study false positives. The intuition is
that if we find a domain or an IP associated with a signature is malicious, the
HTTPTraces that match with this signature will be labeled as malicious.
3. We will show how many days in advance ARROW can detect those drive-by
download attacks compared to those popular public domain/IP reputation sys-
tems.
4. We also demonstrate how ARROW can discover a sophisticated MDN, which
leverages “twitter.com” as the central server to distribute malware, and how
ARROW signatures detect more drive-by download attempts compared to de-
ployed detection systems.
The following section will elaborate on the experimental results.
2.4.3 Experimental Results
We first ran ARROW on the Smalicious HTTPTraces to discover Hostname-IP Clusters
and identified 14, 648 HICs. Some hostnames show strong fast-flux patterns. For
example, one HIC has only 6 hostnames but 1, 041 IP addresses, while another HIC
has 34, 882 hostnames which resolve to a single IP address. The HIC structure
can effectively discover and represent the relationship among such hostnames and IP
addresses.
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Table 5: Evaluation results





Value 1,345,890 1,612,166 320,310 1,291,856 23.8% 96.0%
After representing each server with the HIC index, ARROW follows the approach
described in Section 2.3.3 to identify MDNs and central servers. For the HTTPTraces
in Smalicious that are identified as drive-by download attacks by grouping them based
on “bHash” or the HIC index of each URL in “exploitURLs”, ARROW identified
6, 937 MDNs in total and 97 MDNs (1.4%) using one or more central servers. Since
each central server is represented by an Hostname-IP-Cluster (HIC), these 97 MDNs
involve 104 central servers, which contain 918 hostnames and 190 IPs. By analyz-
ing the URLs for the central servers of these 97 MDNs, ARROW generated 2, 592
regular expression signatures. After pruning these signatures with Sbenign1, ARROW
produced 2, 588 signatures including the examples presented in Table 4.
The obtained signatures could be used for detection. We apply all the signa-
tures to the 3.5 billion HTTPTraces in Stotal. We name Hd as the set of suspi-
cious HTTPTraces already detected by the high-interaction client honeypots, where
Hd = Smalicious. Ha denotes the set of suspicious HTTPTraces that are detected by
the signatures generated by ARROW. Table 5 compares the result of the suspicious
HTTPTraces detected by existing honeypots and signatures from ARROW. The col-
umn labeled Ha∩Hd
Hd
illustrates that these central server signatures have a coverage of
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Figure 10: Detection results on a daily basis
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23.8% of the HTTPTraces detected by existing approaches. The columns of “Hd”
and “Ha” indicate that ARROW signatures identify more suspicious HTTPTraces.
In particular, the ARROW signatures contribute a large number of new suspicious
HTTPTraces (96.0%.) Figures 10(a) and 10(b) present the number of suspicious
HTTPTraces detected by ARROW compared to the existing approach on a daily ba-
sis. Such boosted detection results demonstrate the significant advantage using AR-
ROW as a parallel drive-by download detection system to existing honeypot-based
detection techniques.
2.4.3.1 Evaluating False Positive Rate
In this section, we will focus on false positive evaluation. The ideal solution to evaluate
false positives requires ground truth, which is referred to as all benign HTTPTraces.
Given the fact that existing detection systems may introduce a huge number of false
negatives, it is not a feasible approach to take those HTTPTraces, which are not
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labeled as “malicious” by existing detection systems, as benign HTTPTraces. An
alternative approach for acquiring ground truth is to verify each HTTPTrace by
collaborating with website operators. For example, we can contact the operator who
manages a certain landing page to investigate whether the HTTPTrace associated
with this landing page was compromised during our detection period. Unfortunately,
simply because of the scale of the dataset we studied (i.e., 3.5 billion HTTPTraces),
this solution is practically impossible. In order to address this challenge, we instead
leverage the maliciousness of domains or IPs involved in ARROW signatures. It is
a practically feasible approach since several popular domain/IP reputation systems,
which can suggest the maliciousness of a certain domain or IP, are publicly available,
such as support.clean-mx.de and www.malwaredomains.com. Specifically, if the
domain or the IP address in a signature is confirmed as “malicious”, we will take
HTTPTraces detected by this signature as malicious.
However, these reputation systems may suffer from limited visibility of whole ma-
licious network infrastructure. Consequently, they may miss many malicious domains
and IPs that are detected by ARROW. Table 6 and Table 7 present two examples
to illustrate this problem. For instance, a center server contains one domain (“mys-
terio.info”) and three IP addresses, among which only the domain and one IP are
confirmed as “malicious” by the reputation systems. However, a manual investiga-
tion using search engine of the remaining two IPs revealed their great suspiciousness.
For the second central server, 114 IP addresses are resolved to one single IP address,
and only one domain and the IP address are verified as “malicious” by the reputa-
tion systems. However, the remaining domains appear to be generated by certain
random domain generation algorithm [54], which is commonly used by attackers. In
fact, many of these domains were actually confirmed to be malicious based on manual
search. Therefore, apart from only focusing on the reputation of domains and IPs,
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we consider the reputation of a central server, which is presented by an Hostname-
IP-Cluster (see Section 2.3.2), a group of domains and IPs sharing the same network
infrastructure. Intuitively, more domains or IPs in a central server are malicious, the
higher probability their corresponding network infrastructure is used for malicious
purpose. In our evaluation, we follow a very conservative way: we label a central
server as “suspicious” if either all domains or all IPs in this central server are verified
as “malicious” based on the domain/IP reputation systems. Given a “suspicious”
central server, we label its remaining domains and IPs, which have not been verified
as “malicious” yet, as “suspicious”. Returning to the central server in Table 6, 100%
of its domains , “mysterio.info”, is labeled as “malicious”, and hence we take this
central server as “suspicious”. As a result, “193.104.27.242” and “193.105.184.226”
will be labelled as “suspicious”.
Following aforementioned approaches, we have verified totally 506 (55%) out of
918 domains and 190 IPs as “malicious” using several popular domain/IP reputation
systems. Further, we labeled 97 out of 104 central servers as “suspicious”, which
result in another 396 (43%) suspicious domains and IPs. Finally, 16 (2%) domains
and IPs are neither “malicious” nor “suspicious”, and we label them as “potentially
benign”. The first row in Table 8 presents the percentage of domains/IPs labelled as
“malicious”, “suspicious”, and “potentially benign”, respectively. The second row in
the same table present the percentage of newly detected HTTPTraces that can match
with those signatures, whose domains/IPs are labeled as “malicious”, “suspicious”,
and “potentially benign”, respectively. According to the table, we can find that
the vast majority (92.4%) of newly detected drive-by attacks are associated with
malicious domains/IPs and a significant percentage (7.4%) of them are associated
with suspicious domains/IPs, leaving a tiny portion of 0.2% (2,600 HTTPTraces) as
potential false positives.
We also match these signatures against all URLs in Sbenign2. Out of total 10, 733, 282
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Table 8: The percentage of domains/IPs and HTTPTraces verified
malicious suspicious potentially benign
Domains/IPs 55% 43% 2%
HTTPTraces 92.4% 7.4% 0.2%
Table 9: The percentage of domains/IPs and HTTPTraces verified for each period
≤ Jan 2010 Feb & March 2010 ≥ April 2010
34.5% 56.7% 8.8%
legitimate HTTPTraces, only 2 HTTPTraces are matched with the signatures. This
indicates that ARROW signatures introduce negligible low false positive rate for those
landing pages with high reputation (e.g., landing pages that are popular and well-
maintained).
To conclude, ARROW signatures yield 2,600 potential false positives in Stotal (3.5
billion HTTPTraces) and 2 false positives in Sbenign2 (11 million HTTPTraces). Such
experimental results demonstrate an extremely low false positive rate of 7.4 ∗ 10−5%
(2602 out of around 3.5 billion HTTPTraces).
2.4.3.2 Early Detection
While the vast majority (92.4%) of newly detected are finally verified by public
domain/IP reputation systems, ARROW signatures show significant advantage by
achieving early detection. On the one hand, among 506 domains and IPs that are
verified by the reputation systems, we successfully acquired exposure dates for 468 do-
mains and IPs (corresponding to 89% drive-by download attacks). On the other hand,
since our dataset were obtained in Feb and March 2010, we get ARROW signatures at
the last day of March 2010. Then we can evaluate how many days in advance we can
use ARROW signatures to detect drive-by download attacks compared to the knowl-
edge acquired from popular public domain/IP reputation systems. As presented in
Table 9, 34.5% drive-by download attacks could be detected using reputation systems
before Feb 2010, and 56.7% can be detected during Feb and March 2010. However,
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Figure 11: ∆ (time interval) in weeks
8.8% drive-by download attacks (93,488 attacks) could not be detected based on rep-
utation systems before the last day of March 2010, at which time ARROW signatures
are generated for detection. For each of these 93,488 HTTPTraces, we calculate ∆
as the time interval between April 1, 2010 (the detection time for ARROW) and the
public exposure date for a domain or an IP in the used reputation systems. Fig-
ure 11 presents the distribution of ∆, which demonstrates that ARROW signatures
can detect these drive-by download attacks much earlier compared to those reputation
systems. The average ∆ is 172 days.
2.4.3.3 Case Study for the Twitter Signature
Out of the signatures generated by ARROW, “twitter.com” appears in one signature
in Table 4. This signature identified a large number of 135, 875 suspicious HTTP-




detected suspicious HTTPTraces. Since “twitter.com” is a well known website used
for social networking and microblogging, false positives are a concern. In this sec-
tion, we conduct a detailed analysis of all HTTPTraces matched by the “twitter.com”
signature to assess whether or not it is a false positive.
First, we briefly describe why twitter was involved in a large number of drive-by
download attacks. Manual analysis reveals that a suspicious webpage retrieves the
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Value 135,875 60,159 125.9% 119,774 99.6%



























Central Server ("twitter" signature)
Figure 12: Active days for the central server and exploit servers (60 days)
week’s top trending terms using Twitter’s API, dynamically constructs a hostname
from these changing terms, and then instructs the browser to retrieve the exploit from
the server corresponding to that hostname. A detailed description of the script that
performs these actions can be obtained from a website dedicated to raising awareness
of online threats [6].
Figure 12 and its zoom-in view Figure 13 present the temporal patterns of the
MDN identified by the “twitter.com” central server. The X-axis illustrates the days
the hostname appears in our collected HTTPTraces over time, whereas the Y-axis rep-
resents the index into the set of dynamically generated hostnames based on Twitter’s
API. As the graph illustrates, the hostname is switched on a regular basis represent-
ing a strong fast-flux pattern, while the central server (“twitter.com”) remains stable.
This architecture introduces a great challenge for the detection techniques that iden-
tify the server responsible for hosting the actual exploit. In this MDN, this server
changes every few days. However, the signature generated by ARROW captures the
central server, which is the most stable point over time. Therefore, signatures gener-
ated by ARROW can detect a large number of the suspicious HTTPTraces, even if
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Central Server ("twitter" signature)
Figure 13: Active days for the central server and exploit servers (zoom-in view for
first 7 days)
the corresponding server hosting the exploit changes or is temporarily unavailable.
To assess the false positive rate of the signature, we need to further categorize the
matched HTTPTraces. The column Ha is described previously. In addition, 60, 159
HTTPTraces, denoted as Hd in Table 10, in the Ha traces have been identified as
drive-by downloads by the existing approach. These HTTPTraces in Ha can be
classified as follows into three categories:
1. The client honeypot retrieves the exploit from the aforementioned server and is
compromised. The client honeypot can successfully detect the drive-by down-
loads in this scenario.
2. The client honeypot makes a request to the exploit server but fails to retrieve
the exploit.
3. The client honeypot visits “twitter.com”, but no further connection attempts
are made to the exploit server.
Manual analysis reveals that an HTTP request to the server hosting the exploit
contains specific keywords as part of the URL’s path. These keywords are listed in
Table 11 and would be an indication of malicious intent (categories 1 and 2 above).
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In total, 119, 774 or 88.15% of HTTPTraces match these keywords as described in
column “Hk” in Table 10 leaving a large portion of 11.85% as potential false positives.
Since no subsequent requests are made after “twitter.com” has been contacted for
category 3, it is challenging to obtain evidence on whether these HTTPTraces also
have malicious intent. However, if we assume that a compromised server hosts a large
number of similar malicious webpages, we can further assess the malicious intent of
these HTTPTraces. We do so with a function called ReflectRate , which expresses the
rate of suspicious HTTPTraces based on that assumption.
Table 11: Keywords for detection
keywords “/tre/ ”, “/nte/ ”, “/ld/ ”, “.exe”
The ReflectRate is calculated as follows. We use ht to represent an HTTPTrace
and H to denote a set of HTTPTraces (H = {ht1, ht2, . . . , htn}). We further use the
functions LP () to return the landing page for an HTTPTrace and Host() to obtain the
hostname of a URL. Given H , we introduce a function HostSet() to indicate the set
of hostnames in the landing pages, HostSet(H) = ∪ni=1{Host(LP (hti))}. We then de-
fine a function Reflect(H1, H2) to return a set of HTTPTraces Hr = Reflect(H1, H2),
where Hr = {hti|hti ∈ H2, Host(LP (hti)) ∈ HostSet(H1)}. Hr represents a subset
of HTTPTraces in H2, whose landing pages are hosted on servers (e.g., HostSet(H1))
that have been confirmed to serve malicious webpage content. Based on these func-
tions, we define ReflectRate(H1, H2) =
|Hr|
|H2|
. For example, suppose H1 = {ht1, ht2}
is a set of suspicious HTTPTraces detected by existing methods, where LP (ht1) =
www.foo.com/index.php and LP (ht2) = www.bar.com/index.php. We also find
HostSet(H1) = { www.foo.com, www.bar.com}. Assume we are also presented with
a set of unlabeled HTTPTraces H2 = {hta, htb, htc, htd}, where LP (hta) = www.foo.
com/contact.php, LP (htb) = www.foo.com/test.php, LP (htc) = www.bar.com/
temp.php and LP (htd) = www.test.com/index.php. We can classify three out of
four HTTPTraces in H2 as suspicious, which is Reflect(H1, H2) = {hta, htb, htc}, since
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Host(LP (hta/b/c)) ∈ HostSet(H1). The resulting ReflectRate(H1, H2) would be 75%.
Applied to our case study of “twitter.com”, we obtain a ReflectRate of 99.6%
leaving 0.4% or 544 of the identified traces as potential false positives as shown in the
last column of Table 10.
2.5 Discussion
Our evaluation has shown that the ARROW system successfully boosts detection of
suspicious pages with an overall low false positive rate of 7.4 ∗ 10−5%. The ability
to run ARROW in production may be compromised if the signatures cause popular
websites to be detected as malicious (i.e. false positives). Strategies to reduce the
likelihood of this happening, such as white listing or clustering based on page char-
acteristics, are left for future work. Signature pruning is based on a large data set of
benign HTTPTraces. Collecting a comprehensive dataset of definite benign traces,
however, is very hard in practice. One could collect URLs corresponding to the most
popular queries in the search engine logs or URLs that are most popular in the ISP or
enterprise networks with the assumption being that popular webpages are less likely
to host drive-by downloads. Nevertheless, as attackers usually compromise legitimate
sites to hijack its traffic as an entry point into their MDN, this assumption may not
always hold true. It may result in some signatures being pruned that shouldn’t have
been and some HTTPTraces being incorrectly marked as false positives. However,
given that malicious webpages are overall quite rare among popular webpages (e.g.,
0.6% of the top million URLs in Google’s search results led to malicious activity ac-
cording to [65]), the vast majority of HTTPTraces collected in such a way will indeed
be benign and can be used for pruning and evaluation.
Evasion may be another concern with our system. Similar to other drive-by down-
load detection systems, by knowing our detection algorithm, attackers can always
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carefully redesign the attack strategy to evade our detection. For example, the at-
tackers can generate a different binary for each time of an attack, which will in
consequence cause different binary hash values and thus prevent ARROW from ag-
gregating them into the same MDN. To deal with this problem, more information,
such as the similarity of different binaries or behavior characteristics [55, 70, 86], can
be adopted to aggregate polymorphic malware into MDNs. The attackers can also de-
centralize the MDNs to eliminate the central servers or hide the MDN structure from
the client (e.g. through server side includes instead of redirect chains.) As the MDNs
identified by ARROW do not provide comprehensive coverage on all HTTPTraces
(with current coverage 23.8%) identified by traditional methods, it is an indication
that some of these evasion techniques are used today. These are accepted shortcom-
ings of our approach, and we will look towards refining our existing algorithm and
exploring new approaches to detect MDNs as part of our future work.
2.6 Summary
Drive-by download attacks have become the primary approach used for malware in-
fection. Therefore, detecting drive-by download attacks is an extremely important
task since it can help us detect bots in the infection phase, thereby preventing bots
from performing malicious activities in their early stage. We have shown that by
aggregating data from a large number of drive-by download attempts, we are able to
discover both simple malware distribution networks as well as more complex MDNs
including one or more central servers. We have conservatively estimated that 1.4%
(97 out of 6,937) of MDNs employ central servers. While this percentage is cur-
rently small, the overall coverage of these complex MDNs is 23.8% (320,310 out of
1,345,890 malicious traces) which is reasonably large considering the small number of
actual MDNs with central servers. Going forward, we expect the number of attackers
employing sophisticated methods to manage their operations to grow.
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The major hurdle for deploying ARROW to detect MDNs utilizing central servers
and block all landing pages which redirect to these servers is developing ways to
accurately identify false positives. This problem is generic to any method attempting
to solve this problem and is not a reflection of the proposed system. We have shown
that the regular expression signatures have a very low false positive rate of 7.4∗10−5%.
However, it is not practical to employ an army of analysts to investigate all signatures
generated by the system, particularly given the highly dynamic ecosystem being used
by attackers today. Developing better, automated methods of assessing the purpose
of these central servers in the absence of a successful attack needs to be a focus of
future research. Without access to this ideal system in the near term, it may be
prudent to restrict internet content from users (i.e. not display the webpages from
a search query or serve ads which redirect to the central server) in order to err on
the side of caution. While this may potentially penalize legitimate content providers
initially as the system is deployed, having a method for an individual organization to
understand the underlying cause of any true false positives and a method to quickly
rectify any errors will help balance the competing objectives of providing end users,
the potential bot-infection victims, with the widest range of content while keeping





In Chapter 2, we focus on detecting botnets in the infection phase. While detect-
ing botnets in the infection phase is of great importance, it is not sufficient. The
major reason is that certain infection activities may fly under the radar of deployed
network-based detection systems. For example, a computer could be infected by a
bot binary from a physically connected USB stick, thereby not arousing any malicious
network traffic. As a consequence, detecting botnets in the control phase becomes
indispensable, which is the focus of this chapter.
In the control phase, botmasters rely on C&C channels to control and coordinate
bots. Botmasters could build the C&Cs with different structures, such as centralized
structures and peer-to-peer (P2P) structures. In a centralized structure, all bots in a
botnet contact one (or a few) C&C server(s) owned by the botmaster. Centralized
C&C channels based on the IRC or HTTP protocol have been used by many botnets due
to their simplicity and availability of open-source, reusable C&C server code. How-
ever, centralized C&C servers represent a single point of failure. Therefore, attackers
have recently started to build botnets with a more resilient C&C architecture, using
a peer-to-peer (P2P) structure [76, 66, 67] or hybrid P2P/centralized C&C struc-
tures [37]. Bots belonging to a P2P botnet (i.e., a botnet that uses P2P-based C&C
communications) form an overlay network in which any of the nodes (i.e., any of the
bots) can be used by the botmaster to distribute commands to the other peers or
collect information from them. While more complex, and perhaps more costly to
manage compared to centralized botnets, P2P botnets offer higher resiliency, since
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even if a significant portion of a P2P botnet is taken down (e.g., by law enforcement
or network operators) the remaining bots may still be able to communicate with each
other and with the botmaster. Notable examples of P2P botnets are represented by
Nugache [68], Storm [66], Waledac [37], and even Confiker, which has been shown
to embed P2P capabilities [67]. Storm and Waledac are of particular interest because
they use P2P C&C structures as the primary way to organize their bots, and have
demonstrated resilience to take-down attempts.
To date, a few approaches for detecting P2P botnet have been proposed [36, 72,
79]. BotMiner [36] finds groups of hosts within a monitored network that share
similar communication patterns with outside machines and at the same time perform
similar malicious activities, such as scanning, spamming, launching remote exploits,
etc. If such groups of hosts exist, they are considered to be part of a botnet and
an alarm is raised. The intuition is that bots belonging to the same botnet will
share similar C&C communication patterns, and will respond to the botmaster’s
commands with similar malicious activities. Unfortunately, modern botnets are using
more and more stealthy ways to perform malicious activities. For example, some
botnets may send spam through large popular webmail services such as Gmail or
Hotmail [94]. Such activities are very hard to detect through network flow analysis,
due to encryption and overlap with legitimate webmail usage patterns, thus making
BotMiner ineffective. BotGrep [72] analyzes network flows collected over multiple
large networks (e.g., ISP networks), and attempts to detect P2P botnets by analyzing
the communication graph formed by overlay networks. Starting from a global view
of Internet traffic, BotGrep first identifies groups of hosts that form a P2P network.
To further differentiate P2P botnets from the legitimate P2P networks (e.g., P2P file
sharing networks), BotGrep requires additional information to bootstrap its detection
algorithm. For example, BotGrep may use a list of nodes in a communication (sub-
)graph that are related to honeypot hosts, or may leverage the detection results from
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intrusion detection systems. However, acquiring both a sufficiently global view of
Internet communications and enough a priori information to bootstrap the detection
algorithm may be very challenging and makes the detection results (which in [94]
were mainly based on simulations) heavily dependent on other systems, thus limiting
the real-world applicability of BotGrep. Recently, Yen et al. [79] have proposed an
algorithm that aims to distinguish between hosts that run legitimate P2P file sharing
applications and P2P bots. However, the proposed algorithm [79] does not take
into account the fact that some popular legitimate P2P applications may not exhibit
network patterns typical of P2P file sharing applications. For example, Skype, a very
popular P2P-based instant messenger, does not usually behave in a way similar to file
sharing applications. For example, large file transfers through Skype are usually rare,
compared to its use as an instant messenger or voice-over-IP (VoIP) client. Therefore,
Skype’s P2P traffic may cause a significant number of false positives. Moreover, the
algorithm in [79] is not able to detect bot-compromised hosts that exhibit mixed
legitimate and botnet-related P2P traffic (e.g., due to users running a file sharing
P2P application on machines compromised with P2P bots).
In this chapter, we present a novel botnet detection system that is able to identify
stealthy P2P botnets, whose attacks are very hard to be observed in the network
traffic. Our approach identifies P2P bots within a monitored network by detecting the
C&C communication patterns that characterize P2P botnets, regardless of how they
perform malicious activities in response to the botmaster’s commands. To accomplish
this task, we first identify all hosts within a monitored network that appear to be
engaging in P2P communications. Then, we derive statistical fingerprints of the P2P
communications generated by these hosts, and leverage the obtained fingerprints to
distinguish between hosts that are part of legitimate P2P networks (e.g., file-sharing
networks) and P2P bots. Unlike previous work, our system is able to identify stealthy
P2P bots within a monitored network even when the P2P botnet traffic is overlapped
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with traffic generated by legitimate P2P applications (e.g., Skype) running on the
same compromised host.
To summarize, our work makes the following contributions:
1. A new flow-clustering-based analysis approach to identify hosts that are most
likely running P2P applications, and estimate the active time of the detected
P2P nodes.
2. An efficient algorithm for P2P traffic fingerprinting, which we use to build a
statistical profile of different P2P applications.
3. A P2P botnet detection system that can effectively and accurately detect P2P
bots, even when they perform malicious activities in a stealthy, non-observable
way. In addition, our system is able to identify bot-compromised machines, even
when the P2P botnet traffic is overlapped with traffic generated by legitimate
P2P applications (e.g., Skype) running on the same compromised machine.
4. A scalable system design based on computationally efficient detection algorithm
and load-balance workload distribution.
5. An implementation of our detection system and an extensive experimental eval-
uations. Our experimental results show that i) the system can detect P2P bots
with a detection rate of 100% and 0.2% false positive rate, ii) the system achieves
great scalability, processing more than 80 million flows within 1 hour.
3.2 Related Work
As P2P botnets become robust infrastructures for various malicious activities, they
have attracted a lot of efforts from researchers [76, 66, 81, 67, 20]; the most no-
table and studied P2P botnets are Nugache [76], Storm [66, 81], Waledac [37], and
Confiker [67]. A few approaches have been proposed that can be used for P2P botnet
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detection [36, 72, 79], which have been discussed in Section 3.1. BotHunter [35] was
proposed to detect a bot, centralized or P2P, in its infection phase if the infection
behaviors are consistent with the infection model used by BotHunter. However, bots
now use a wide variety of approaches for infection (e.g., drive-by downloads), which
may not be consistent with BotHunter’s infection model.
Our work focuses on the detection of P2P botnets using network information.
Compared with the existing approaches, the design goals of our approach are differ-
ent in that: 1) our approach does not assume that malicious activities are observable,
unlike [36]; 2) our approach does not require any botnet-specific information to make
the detection, unlike [72]; and 3) our approach aims to detect the compromised hosts
that run both P2P bot and other legitimate P2P applications at the same time, un-
like [79]. To achieve these design goals, our system includes multiple components.
The first one is a flow-clustering-based analysis approach to identify hosts that are
mostly likely running P2P applications. In contrast to existing approaches of identi-
fying hosts running P2P applications [83, 73, 82, 15, 60], our approach differs from
them in the following ways: 1) unlike [73], our approach does not need any content
signature because encryption will immediately make content signature useless; 2) our
approach does not rely on any transport layer heuristics (e.g., fixed source port) used
by [82, 83], which can be easily violated by P2P applications; 3) we do not need
training data set to build a machine learning based model as used in [15], because
it is very challenging to get traffic of P2P botnets before they are detected; 4) in
contrast to [60], our approach can detect and profile various P2P applications rather
than identifying a specific P2P application (e.g., Bittorrent); and 5) our analysis ap-
proach can estimate the active time of a P2P application, which is critical for botnet
detection.
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Figure 14: System overview
3.3 System
3.3.1 Problem Formulation
Our goal is to monitor the network traffic at the edge of a network (e.g., an enterprise
network), and identify whether any of the machines within the network perimeter has
become part of a P2P botnet. In particular, we consider the scenario in which bots
perform malicious activities in a stealthy way, for example spam-bots that send spam
through stolen or malicious web-mail accounts (e.g., Gmail or Hotmail accounts) [94],
whose malicious activities are very hard to detect from traffic analysis. In general, we
assume that the bots’ malicious activities may not be easily observable, and therefore
we only focus on their C&C communication patterns. We assume that at least two or
more machines within the monitored network are part of the same P2P botnet, and
leverage the similarity in communication patterns across multiple bots for detection
purposes.
3.3.2 System Overview
P2P-based botnets rely on a P2P protocol to establish a C&C channel and communi-
cate with the botmaster. As such, we intuitively assume that P2P bots exhibit some
network traffic patterns that are common to other P2P client applications (either
legitimate or malicious). Therefore, we divide our systems into two phases.
52
Phase I: At the first phase, we aim at detecting all hosts within the monitored
network that appear to be engaging in P2P communications, as shown in Figure 14.
We analyze raw traffic collected at the edge of the monitored network (e.g., an enter-
prise network), and apply a pre-filtering step (discussed in Section 3.3.3) to reduce
the data volume and only consider network flows that are potentially related to P2P
communications. Then, we analyze the remaining traffic and extract a number of
statistical features (described in Section 3.3.7.1), which we use to isolate flows related
to P2P communications from unrelated flows, and identify candidate P2P clients.
Phase II: In the second phase, our botnet detection system (detailed in Sec-
tion 3.3.6) analyzes the traffic generated by the candidate P2P clients and classifies
them into either legitimate P2P clients or P2P bots. The architecture of our botnet
detection system is based on a number of observations.
1. First, bots are malicious programs used to perform profitable malicious activi-
ties. They represent valuable assets for the botmaster, who will intuitively try
to maximize their utilization. As a consequence, bot programs usually make
themselves persistent on the compromised system and run as long as the sys-
tem is powered on. This is particularly true for P2P bots, because in order
to have a functional overlay network (the botnet), a sufficient number of peers
needs to be always online. In other words, the active time of a bot should be
comparable with the active time of the underlying compromised system. If this
was not the case, the botnet overlay network would risk to degenerate into a
number of disconnected subnetworks, due to the short life time of each single
node. On the other hand, the active time of legitimate P2P applications is
determined by users. For example, some users tend to use their file-sharing
P2P clients only to download a limited number of files, before shutting down
the P2P application [30]. In this case, the active time of the legitimate P2P
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application may be much shorter compared to the active time of the underlying
system. Based on this observation, our botnet detection system first estimates
the active time of a P2P client and eliminates those hosts that are running P2P
applications with short active time, compared to the underlying system. It is
worth noting that some users may run certain legitimate P2P applications for
as long as their machine is on. For example, Skype is a popular P2P application
for instant messaging and voice-over-IP (VoIP) that is often setup to start after
system boot, and that keeps running until the system is turned off. Therefore,
such Skype clients (or other “persistent” P2P clients) will not be filtered out at
this stage.
2. In order to discriminate between legitimate persistent P2P clients and P2P
bots, we make use of the following observations: 1) bots that belong to the same
botnet use the same P2P protocol and network, and 2) the set of peers contacted
by two different bots have a much larger overlap, compared to peers contacted
by two P2P clients connected to the same legitimate P2P network. While
the first observation is obvious, the second observation deserves explanation.
Assume that two hosts in the monitored network, say hA and hB, are running the
same legitimate P2P file-sharing application (e.g., Emule). The users of these
two P2P clients will most likely have uncorrelated usage patterns. Namely,
it is reasonable to assume that in the general case the two users will search
for and download different content (e.g., different media files or documents)
from the P2P network. This translates into a divergence between the set of
IP addresses contacted by hosts hA and hB (remember that at this stage we
are only considering the P2P traffic generated by the hosts). The reason is
that the two P2P clients will tend to exchange P2P control messages (e.g.,
ping/pong and search requests) with different sets of peers which “own” the
content requested by their users, or peers that are along the path towards the
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content. On the contrary, if hA and hB are compromised with P2P bots, one
of the characteristics of the bots is that they need to periodically search for
commands published by the botmaster [81]. This typically translates into a
convergence between the set of IPs contacted by hA and hB.
To summarize, in order to detect P2P bots we follow the high-level steps reported
below:
1. Identify the set H of all hosts engaged in P2P communications.
2. Identify the subset P ⊆ H of P2P clients whose active time is similar to the
active time of the underlying systems.
3. Identify the subset B ⊆ P which exhibit similar P2P communication patterns,
and have a significant overlap of the set of contacted peers. We classify the
hosts in set B as P2P bots.
To illustrate the statistical features and motivate the related thresholds used by
our system, we used five popular P2P applications (see Table 12) for 24 hours to collect
their traffic traces. For the Bittorrent application, we generated two separate 24-hour
traces (T-Bittorrent and T-Bittorrent-2). In this section we report a number of
measurements on the obtained traffic traces to better motivate some of our design
choices. Table 14 reports the feature values measured on the collected traffic traces.
The notation used for our statistical features is summarized in Table 13.
We now describe the components of our detection system in more details.
3.3.3 Traffic Volume Reduction
As a first step, we want to filter out network traffic (and their sources) that is unlikely
to be related to P2P communications. This is accomplished in part by passively
analyzing DNS traffic, and identifying network flows whose destination IP addresses
were previously resolved in DNS responses. The reason is that P2P clients usually
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Table 12: P2P applications






Table 13: Notations and descriptions
notation Description
Tp2p the active time of P2P application
Nf the number of failed connections per hour
No-DNS Peers the percentage of flows associated with no domain names
Nclust the number of clusters left by enforcing Θbgp and Θp2p
Nbgp the largest number of unique bgp prefixes in one cluster
ˆTp2p the estimated active time for P2P application
Table 14: Measurement of features
Trace Tp2p Nf No-DNS Peers Nclust Nbgp ˆTp2p
T-Bittorrent 24hr 1602 96.85% 17 12857 24hr
T-Emule 24hr 318 99.99% 8 1133 24hr
T-Limewire 24hr 1278 99.97% 36 5661 24hr
T-Skype 24hr 81 99.93% 12 12806 24hr
T-Ares 24hr 489 99.99% 16 1596 24hr
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contact their peers directly, by looking up IPs from a routing table for the overlay
network, rather than resolving a domain name (a possible exception may be when
a peer bootstraps into a P2P network by looking up domain names that resolve to
stable super-nodes). This observation is supported by Table 14 (No-DNS Peers),
which illustrates the percentage of flows whose destination IP addresses were not
resolved from a domain name. It confirms that the vast majority of flows generated
by P2P applications do not have destination IPs resolved from domain names. The
remaining small fraction of flows are either related to bootstrapping (e.g., in the case
of bittorrent.com and skype.com) or for downloading advertisement content from
popular websites. Since most non-P2P applications (e.g., browsers, email clients, etc.)
often connect to a destination address resulting from domain name resolution, this
simple filter can eliminate a very large percentage of non-P2P traffic (see Section 3.4)
while retaining the vast majority of P2P communications.
3.3.4 Identifying P2P Clients
After traffic volume reduction we consider the remaining traffic, and for each host h
within the monitored network we identify three flow sets (we call “outgoing” those
flows that have been initiated by h):
1. Stcp(h): flows related to successful outgoing TCP connections.
2. Sudp(h): flows related to successful outgoing UDP (virtual) connections.
3. So(h): flows related to failed outgoing TCP/UDP connections.
We consider as successful those TCP connections with a completed SYN, SYN/ACK,
ACK handshake, and those UDP (virtual) connections for which there was at least one
“request” packet and a consequent response packet.
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P2P applications act as both clients and servers. A node in a P2P network can
initiate (TCP or UDP virtual) connections to its peers and accept connections initi-
ated by other peers. In client-mode, P2P nodes periodically probe their peers with
ping/pong messages to maintain a view of the overlay network (usually for routing
purposes), or search for content. A consequence of this behavior is the fact that
P2P nodes will often generate a large number of failed outgoing flows. The reason is
that P2P networks are usually characterized by a significant node churn [30], due to
previous nodes that leave the network and new nodes that join it (the churn is intu-
itively correlated with users that turn on or off their P2P applications or machines).
Therefore, a node that sends a ping message to a known peer will often discover that
the peer is not up anymore (no pong is received, thus causing a failed connection).
At this point, we retain all hosts that generated at least a successful outgoing
TCP or UDP connection, and that generated more than a predefined number Θo of
outgoing failed TCP/UDP connections. Namely, we retain a host h if |Stcp(h)| +
|Sudp(h)| > 0 AND So(h) > Θo, and discard all other hosts (it is worth noting that
here we are only considering those flows that passed the DNS-based traffic volume
reduction filter described in Section 3.3.3). Table 14, reports the number Nf of failed
outgoing connections per hour for different P2P applications. We can see that P2P
applications typically generate a large number (from several tens up to thousands) of
failed connection attempts with other peers. Therefore, we conservatively set Θo = 10.
What we just described is a “Coarse-Grained Detection of P2P Clients” that al-
lows us to focus on candidate P2P nodes. We further apply a “Fine-Grained Detection
of P2P Clients” to prune away hosts that are not actual P2P nodes. For example, we
want to eliminate hosts that made it into the list of candidate P2P nodes by chance
(e.g., because of scanning behavior). To this end, we first consider the fact that
each node of a P2P network frequently exchanges a number of control messages (e.g.,








































Figure 15: CDF of flow sizes
these messages, such as the size and frequency of the exchanged packets, are similar
for nodes in the same P2P network, and vary depending on the P2P protocol and
network in use. In addition, we notice that a node will often exchange control mes-
sages with a relatively large number of peers distributed in many different networks,
where each network can be represented by its BGP prefix. Figure 15 describes the
distribution of flow sizes for two Bittorrent traces, where a large number of flows
share similar sizes.
To identify flows corresponding to P2P control messages, we first apply a flow
clustering process intended to group together similar flows for each candidate P2P
node h. Given sets of flows Stcp(h) and Sudp(h), we characterize each flow using a
vector of statistical features v(h) = [Pkts, Pktr, Bytes, Byter], in which Pkts and
Pktr represent the number of packets sent and received, and Bytes and Byter repre-
sent the number of bytes sent and received, respectively. We then apply a clustering
algorithm (described in Section 3.3.7.1) to partition the set of vectors (i.e., of flows)
Vtcp(h) = {v(h)i}i=1..|Stcp(h)| and Vudp(h) = {v(h)i}i=1..|Sudp(h)| into a number of clus-
ters. Each of the obtained clusters of flows, Cj(h), represents a group of flows with
similar size. For each Cj(h) (notice that each vector can be mapped back to the
flow it describes), we consider the set of destination IP addresses related to the flows
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in the clusters, and for each of these IPs we consider its BGP prefix (using BGP pre-
fix announcements). Finally, we count the number of distinct BGP prefixes related
to destination IPs in a cluster bgpj = BGP (Cj(h)), and discard those clusters of
flows for which bgpj < Θbgp. We call fingerprint clusters the remaining cluster of
flows. Therefore, each host h can now be described by a set of fingerprint clusters
FC(h) = {FC1, .., FCk}. We label h as P2P node if FC(h) 6= ∅, namely if h generated
at least one fingerprint cluster.
We applied clustering-based flow analysis to the sample traces of 5 P2P clients.
Nbgp in Table 14 presents the maximum number of distinct BGP prefixes of destination
IPs in a fingerprint cluster. We therefore conservatively set the threshold Θbgp = 50,
which is much smaller than the measured Nbgp.
Figure 16 illustrates an example of the flow clustering process for a P2P node.
Flows corresponding to ping/pong and peer-discovery share similar sizes respec-
tively, and therefore they are grouped into two clusters (FC1 and FC2). Since
the number of destination BGP prefixes involved in each cluster is larger than Θbgp,
we take FC1 and FC2 as its fingerprint clusters. A fingerprint cluster summary,
(Pkts, Pktr, Bytes, Byter, proto), presents the protocol and the average number of
sent/received packets/bytes for all the flows in this fingerprint cluster. Examples
of fingerprint cluster summaries for two Bittorrent traces, including T-Bittorrent
and T-Bittorrent-2, and one Skype trace, are illustrated in Table 15. “(1 1 145 319,
UDP)” and “(1 1 109 100, UDP)” are shared by both Bittorrent sample traces. The
payload of flows corresponding to these two fingerprint clusters are illustrated in Ta-
ble 16. It reveals that the fingerprint cluster of “(1 1 145 319, UDP)” represents the






























Figure 16: Example of identify P2P hosts based on flow-clustering analysis
3.3.5 Identifying Persistent P2P Clients
As we mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.3, P2P bots make themselves persistent
into the compromised system, and run for as long as the system is powered on. Based
on this observation, the fist component in the “Phase II” of our system (“Coarse-
Grained Detection of P2P Bots”) aims at identifying P2P clients that are active for a
time TP2P close to the active time Tsys of the underlying system they are running on.
While this behavior is not unique of P2P bots and may be representative of other P2P
applications (e.g., Skype clients that run for as long as a machine is on), identifying
persistent P2P clients takes us one step closer to identifying P2P bots.
To estimate Tsys we proceed as follows. For each host h ∈ H that we identified as
P2P clients according to Section 3.3.7.1, we consider the timestamp tstart(h) of the
first network flow we observed from h and the timestamp tend(h) related to the last
flow we have seen from h. Afterwards, we divide the time tend(h) − tstart(h) into w
epochs (e.g., of one hour each), denoted as T = [t1, ..ti, .., tw]. We further compute
a vector A(h, T ) = [a1, ..ai, .., aw] where ai is equal to 1 if h generated any network
traffic between ti−1 and ti. We then estimate the active time of h as Tsys =
∑w
i=1 ai.
The challenge is how to accurately estimate the active time of a P2P application.
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Since a P2P application periodically exchanges network control (e.g., ping/pong) mes-
sages with other peers as long as the P2P application is active, we can leverage the ac-
tive time of a fingerprint cluster, which represents flows of control messages, in order to
estimate the active time of the corresponding P2P application. For each host h (again,
we consider only the hosts in H, which we previously identified as P2P clients) we con-
sider the set of its fingerprint clusters FC(h) = {FC1, ..FCj.., FCk} (see Section 2.3),
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where an element aji is equal to 1 if the fingerprint cluster FCj contains a flow be-
tween ti−1 and ti, otherwise a
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i = 0. We compute the active time of a fingerprint




i . Finally, we estimate the active time (TP2P ) of a
P2P application as ˆTP2P = max(T (FC1), ..T (FCj), ..T (FCk)).
If the ratio r(h) =
ˆTP2P
Tsys
> ΘP2P , we say that h is running a persistent P2P
application, and add it to a set P of candidate P2P bots. Host h will then be input
to our botnet detection algorithm (see Section 3.3.6), where h will be represented
by a set of persistent fingerprint clusters for h, denoted as FCp(h) = {FC
1
i , .., FC
j
k}
where T (FCi)/Tsys > ΘP2P for any FCi ∈ FCp(h).
As illustrated in Table 14, the estimated active time ˆTP2P is the same as the
actual active time (TP2P ) of the P2P application, which demonstrates that ˆTP2P can
accurately approximate TP2P . As we can see from Table 14, when we leave a P2P
application running for as long as the machine is on (24 hours for this particular
experiment) we obtain a ratio r(h) = 1. Therefore, we decided to conservatively set
ΘP2P = 0.5. Nclust in Table 14 illustrates the size of FCp(h), the number of fingerprint
clusters (FCs) whose BGP (FC) > Θbgp and T (FC) > Θp2p.
3.3.6 P2P Botnet Detection Algorithm
Once we have identified the set P of candidate P2P bots, we apply our botnet detec-
tion algorithm, which has been implemented in the second component in the “Phase
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Table 15: Examples of fingerprint cluster summaries
Trace Fingerprints
T-Bittorrent
1 1 145 319, UDP
1 1 109 100, UDP
1 1 146 340, UDP
5 3 346 170, TCP
1 1 145 310, UDP
T-Bittorrent-2
1 1 145.01 317.66, UDP
1 1 109 100, UDP
1 1 146 342, UDP
5 3 346 170, TCP
2 2 466 461, UDP
Trace Fingerprints
Skype
1 1 74.58 60, UDP
1 1 78 60, UDP
1 1 75 60, UDP
1 1 76 60, UDP
1 1 79 60, UDP
Table 16: Payload of flows in a fingerprint cluster of a Bittorrent application
Fingerprints flows outgoing content incoming content description
1 1 145 319, UDP
1 d1:ad2:. . . find node1:. . . :y1:qe d1:rd2:. . . nodes208:. . . :y1:re
2 d1:ad2:. . . find node1:. . . :y1:qe d1:rd2:. . . nodes208:. . . :y1:re peer discovery
. . . d1:ad2:. . . find node1:. . . :y1:qe d1:rd2:. . . nodes208:. . . :y1:re
1 1 109 100, UDP
1 d1:ad2:. . . :ping1:. . . :y1:qe d1:rd2:. . . :y1:re
2 d1:ad2:. . . :ping1:. . . :y1:qe d1:rd2:. . . :y1:re ping/pong
. . . d1:ad2:. . . :ping1:. . . :y1:qe d1:rd2:. . . :y1:re
II” of our system (“Fine-Grained Detection of P2P Bots”). At this stage, our objec-
tive is to differentiate between legitimate persistent P2P clients and P2P bots. As
we mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.3, our detection approach is based on
the following observations: i) bots that belong to the same botnet use the same P2P
protocol and network, and ii) the set of peers contacted by two different bots have a
large overlap, compared to peers contacted by two P2P clients connected to the same
legitimate P2P network. Accordingly, we look for P2P clients that are running the
same protocol and connect to the same P2P network, and whose sets of contacted
destination IPs overlap significantly. We do so by introducing a measure of simi-
larity between the fingerprint clusters, and then grouping P2P clients according to
similarities between their respective fingerprint clusters.
We proceed as follows. For each host h ∈ P, we consider the set of persistent
fingerprint clusters FCp(h) = {FC1, .., FCk} (see Section 3.3.7.1). For each FCi ∈
FCp(h), we compute the average number of bytes sent, Bytes,i, and received, Byter,i,
in all flows in FCi (remember that each fingerprint cluster FCi is a cluster of flows).
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Also, for each cluster FCi we extract the set of peers Πi, i.e., the set of all destination
IPs for the flows in FCi. Therefore, each fingerprint cluster FCi can be summarized
by the tuple (Bytes,i, Byter,i, Πi). This allows us to define a notion of distance
between fingerprint clusters. In practice, we define two separate distance functions
as follows
i) dbytes(FCi, FCj) =
√
(Bytes,i − Bytes,j)
2 + (Byter,i − Byter,j)
2
ii) dIPs(FCi, FCj) = 1 −
|Πi∩Πj |
|Πi∪Πj |
and then we define the distance between two hosts ha and hb as
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k is the k-th fingerprint cluster of host hx










• λ is a predefined constants, which we set to λ = 0.5.
After computing the distance between each pair of hosts (i.e., each pair of candi-
date P2P bots in set P), we apply hierarchical clustering, and group together hosts
according to the distance defined above. In practice, the hierarchical clustering algo-
rithm will produce a dendrogram (a tree-like data structure) as shown in Figure 19.
The dendrogram expresses the “relationship” between hosts. The closer two hosts are,
the lower level they are connected at in the dendrogram. Two P2P bots in the same
botnet should have small distance and thus are connected at lower level (forming a
dense cluster). Even if these P2P bots’ traffic is overlapped with traffic of legitimate
P2P applications, the distance between two bot-compromised hosts is decided by the
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minimum distance of their respective fingerprint clusters. Since the distances of fin-
gerprint clusters from botnet P2P protocols have smaller distance compared to those
from legitimate P2P protocols (due to bots’ large overlap of peer IPs), the minimum
distance will stem from fingerprint clusters of P2P bots instead of legitimate P2P
applications. Therefore, two bot-compromised hosts running legitimate P2P appli-
cations will still exhibit small distance. We then classify hosts in dense clusters as
P2P bots, and discard all other clusters and the related hosts, which we classify as
legitimate P2P clients. In practice, we cut the dendrogram at Θbot (Θbot ∈ [0, 1]) of
the maximum dendrogram height (Θbot ∗ heightmax).
To set Θbot, we assume that: a) we do not have a labeled data set of botnet traffic;
b) the distance between two legitimate P2P applications is much larger than that
between two bots belonging to the same botnet (as motivated above). Therefore, we
conservatively set Θbot = 0.95.
3.3.7 Scalability Optimization
System scalability becomes a serious concern as the traffic volume increases. There-
fore, we need to evaluate and improve the scalability of proposed system to enable its
deployment in high-speed and high-volume networks. In this section, we first identify
the performance bottleneck of the proposed system and then present our design to
improve system performance. In the following discussion, we will use n to represent
the number of flows generated by a host and N to represent the number of hosts in the
monitored network. Out of 5 system components, “traffic filter” can be implemented
with O(n) operation, where flows only need to be scanned once to decide whether their
IPs are matched with any DNS responses. The “Coarse-Grained Detection of P2P
Clients” and “Coarse-Grained Detection of P2P Bots” share the similar performance,
where both of them scan the flows once to obtain the number of failed connections,
and the active time for P2P applications and hosts. The remaining two components,
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“Fine-Grained Detection of P2P Clients” and “Fine-Grained P2P Detection of P2P
Bots”, involve clustering operation (a.k.a., pairwise comparison). The “Fine-Grained
P2P Bot Detection” compares the similarity of two persistent P2P clients. Given
the small percentage of potential P2P clients in the ISP network (e.g., 3%-13% as
reported in [32]) and even smaller portion of persistent P2P clients, this component
is unlikely to introduce performance bottleneck. For example, given a typical /16 ISP
network with 65,536 hosts, if we assume that 8% hosts use P2P clients and further as-
sume that half of them are persistent, then this component will only needs to process
2,221 hosts. The “Fine-Grained P2P Client Detection” component, however, may
introduce significant performance overhead. It calculates the pairwise distance of all
successful outgoing flows from each host, and conduct such calculation for all hosts
that are identified in the previous component. Since the number of queries initiated
by a host could be huge and a large number of hosts still remain after the “Coarse-
Grained P2P Client Detection” component (e.g., around 30% in our evaluation), this
component will likely have the computational complexity of O(N ∗ n2), which could
be prohibitively high. Therefore, the performance bottleneck is the component of
“Fine-Grained P2P Client Detection”.
We follow two directions to eliminate the performance bottleneck. First, we im-
prove the performance of the clustering operation, which groups the similar flows into
a single host. Second, we distribute the flow-clustering workload for all the hosts into
a set of computation nodes (e.g., the Map-Reduce infrastructure) to parallelize the
computation.
3.3.7.1 Clustering Performance Improvement
Instead of directly using the clustering algorithm with O(n2) computational complex-
ity, we design a two-level clustering scheme to improve the performance of clustering
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operation. First, we use BIRCH [84], a streaming clustering algorithm with time com-
plexity O(n), to efficiently identify at most Cntbirch sub-clusters from the sets of TCP
and UDP flows respectively. Cntbirch is a pre-defined parameter and the distance of
two flows is defined as the Euclidean distance of [Pkts, Pktr, Bytes, Byter]. Second,
for each sub-cluster, we aggregate flows in it and represent it using a vector, where
this vector describes the average value of each feature [Pkts, Pktr, Bytes, Byter] of
flows in this sub-cluster. We further apply hierarchical clustering with DaviesBouldin
validation index [58] on top of the vectors (sub-clusters), and find clusters of vectors,
where each cluster represents a set of similar vectors (sub-clusters). Since we obtain at
most Cntbirch sub-clusters from the first-level clustering, the computational complex-
ity for the hierarchical clustering is bounded by O(Cnt2birch). For all the sub-clusters
belonging to a cluster, we finally group the flows in these sub-clusters to the same
cluster of flows. For this two-level clustering scheme, the computational complexity
to process the flows of one P2P node is mainly bounded by O(n+Cnt2birch). Currently
we configure Cntbirch = 4000 (the evaluation of system performance over Cntbirch is
presented in Section 3.4.3.5).
3.3.7.2 Load-Balance Workload Partition
Since the flow analysis based on two-level clustering is independent for each host,
we can distribute the analysis workload to a set of computation nodes, where each
node only needs to perform clustering-based flow analysis for a subset of hosts. The
problem can be formulized as follows: given N hosts denoted as H = {h1, h2, ...hN}
and M computation nodes denoted as C = {c1, c2, ...cM}, how we can partition H
into M exclusive subsets HS1, HS2..HSM so that the computation time, which is
the maximum execution time for each node T = max(exc(ci, HSi)), is minimized.
exc(ci, HSi) returns the execution time for HSi on ci. Theoretically, given the as-
sumption that each computation node has the same capacity, T is minimized when
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{h_1, h_2} {h_3, ..., h_i} {h_j, ..., h_N}
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Figure 17: Partition hosts to M distributed nodes
exc(ci, HSi) is equal to each other. Therefore, our goal is to evenly partition the
workload of N hosts to M computation nodes.
To achieve an even distribution of the workload, we need a function that estimates
the workload (e.g., execution time) for each host, denoted as f(hi). However, it does
not exist an explicit expression describing the relationship of execution time and the
volume of flows for a host. Therefore, we adopt an empirical approach to derive this
function. As each host hi initiates two sets of successful outgoing TCP and UDP flows
(Stcp(hi) and Sudp(hi)), we first introduce a function g(hi) that returns the number
of flows from hi, where g(hi) = |Stcp(hi)|+ |Sudp(hi)|. Second, we randomly sample a
small number of K hosts (e.g., K = 10) from H , denoted as U = {h1i , h
2
j , . . . , h
K
n }, and




j), . . . , g(h
K
n )}.
We further apply the two-level flow-clustering analysis on each host in U , and obtain
their execution time, denoted as T = {t1, t2, . . . , tK}. Given V = {v1, v2, . . . , vK}
and T = {t1, t2, . . . , tK}, we can finally use regression method to learn a function
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t̄i = φ(vi) that estimates the execution time from the volume of flows. Since the
two-level flow-clustering algorithm has less than O(n2) time complexity, we use the
linear regression model. By incorporating function g(), we can get the expression
that estimates the execution time t̄i given an host hi, where t̄i = f(hi) = φ(g(hi)).
After getting f(hi), we introduce a cumulative function F (hi) =
∑w=i
w=1 f(hw). We
assign hi to the dth (d = 1, 2...M) computation node if (d − 1) ∗
F (hN )
M
< F (hi) ≤
d ∗ F (hN )
M
. Figure 17 illustrates this procedure.
By following these two approaches, we successfully eliminate the performance





In this section we present an evaluation of our detection system.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluated the performance of our detection system using real-world network traf-
fic, including traffic collected from our academic network, traffic generated by popular
P2P applications, and live P2P botnet traffic.
The traffic we collected from our academic network came from a span port mir-
roring all traffic crossing the gateway router (around 200-300Mbps) for the college
networks. We used Argus [1] to efficiently collect network flow information of the
traffic between internal and external networks for one entire day. Along with various
flow statistics we also recorded the first 200 bytes of each flow payload, which we used
to identify known legitimate P2P clients within our network. To reduce the volume
and noise in our network traces, we excluded all traffic related to email servers, DNS
servers, and planetlab nodes from our botnet detection analysis. The DNS traffic
was collected simultaneously with the network flow information, using dnscap, to
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keep track of all the domain-to-IP mappings needed to perform traffic volume reduc-
tion. Overall, we observed 953 active hosts, as reported in Table 17. We refer to the
traffic collected from our academic network as NETCoC .
In order to establish some ground truth in terms of what hosts are running P2P ap-
plications, we used a signature-based approach that matches the signatures from [95]
onto the first 200 bytes of each network flow. We further manually investigated each
of these hosts to eliminate false positives (we found some spurious signature matches
deriving from traffic towards SMTP servers that we were not able to pre-filter, and
a few web requests towards our departmental website). After manual validation, we
identified a total of 3 hosts that were running Bittorrent , which in the following
we denoted as “BT1@C”, “BT2@C” and “BT3@C”. Furthermore, there exists no
signature that can match P2P traffic generated by Skype, since Skype communica-
tions are encrypted. However, using the statistical traffic fingerprints, we were able
to identify 5 likely Skype clients within our network (we discuss this in more de-
tail in Section 3.4.3.1), denoted as “Skype1@C”, “Skype2@C”, .., “Skype5@C”. We
refer to the network traces corresponding to these 8 P2P clients as NETP2P@CoC .
One possible reason why we found only a few (fewer than expected) P2P hosts is
that our college network is well-managed and the usage of file sharing applications is
highly discouraged. In addition, the vast majority of the hosts we have monitored are
desktops managed by the college, where regular users have no permission to install
software including Skype.
In order to increase the number and diversity of P2P nodes in our network, we
ran 5 popular P2P applications, whose name and version are listed in Table 12. We
ran each of the 5 P2P applications in two different (virtual) hosts for several hours
(e.g., 24 or 5 hours) simultaneously. Each host was represented by a WindowsXP
(virtual) machine with a public IP address selected within a /24 network. Given a
P2P application among the 5 we considered, we manually interacted with one instance
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Table 17: Statistics of network traffic in our academic network
Trace duration # of TCP / UDP flows # of clients
t-c 24h 61,745,989 / 20,226,837 953
Trace duration # of domains # of IPs
t-dns 24h 328,965 268,753
Table 18: Traces of popular P2P applications
Trace Dur # of flows # of Dst IPs Avg Flow Size
Bittorrent-1/2 24 hr 250960/297785 17337/17657 68310/350205
Limewire-1/2 24 hr 229215/638103 11602/64994 1003/2038
Emule-1/2 24 hr 58941/110821 6649/14554 124267/22681
Skype-1/2 24 hr 88927/49541 10699/6264 514/1988
Ares-1/2 5 hr 17566/21756 1918/3118 69373/24755
(on one host) to simulate typical human-driven application usage behavior, and we
fed the second instance of the application (on the second host) with automatically
generated user-interface input. This artificial user input was simulated using an
AutoIt [2] script that randomly selects contents to be downloaded or uploaded using
the P2P application at random time intervals. Therefore, overall we obtained 10
additional network traces related to traffic generated by P2P applications (Table 18
shows some statistics related to these network traces). We refer to these network
traces as NETP2P .
In addition, we were able to obtain network traces for two popular P2P botnets,
Storm and Waledac. Both traces were collected by purposely running Storm and
Waledac malware samples in a controlled environment, and recording their network
behavior. The Storm traces included 13 different bot-compromised hosts, while the
Waledac included 3 different bot-compromised hosts, as shown in Table 19. It is
worth noting that both traces were collected at a time when the two botnets were fully
active, before any successful takedown attempt was carried out by law enforcement
or network operators. We refer to these network traces as NETbots.
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Table 19: Traces of botnets
Trace duration size # of bots
Waledac 24hr 1.1G 3
Storm 24hr 4.8G 13
3.4.2 Experimental Design
We structured our experiments in five parts:
1. Evaluate the effectiveness of identifying and profiling P2P applications using
statistical fingerprint clusters. (see Section 3.4.3.1)
2. Evaluate the detection performance by pretending that a number of machines
in our network have been compromised with either Storm or Waledac (Sec-
tion 3.4.3.2).
3. Determine whether our system is able to detect P2P bots running on compro-
mised machines that are also running legitimate P2P clients at the same time
(Section 3.4.3.3).
4. Estimate the detection performance in special cases, where only two bots or no
bot (e.g., a “clean” network) appear in the monitored networks (Section 3.4.3.4).
5. Analyze the system scalability (Section 3.4.3.5).
6. Analyze the effect of system parameter Θbot (Section 3.4.3.6).




2. We obtained D1
as follows: For each host (denoted as hp2p) of both 16 P2P bots (in NETbots) and
10 P2P applications (in NETP2P ), we randomly selected one host (denoted as hCoC)
from trace NETCoC , and we overlaid hp2p’s traffic to the hCoC ’s traffic. We aligned
the start time of the hCoC ’s traffic according to the start time of its corresponding
hp2p’s traffic. If the duration of hCoC ’s traffic was th and that of hp2p was tp, where
th > tp, we only kept the first tp of hCoC ’s traffic. In effect, we simulated the scenario
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Table 20: Bot traces overlaid with P2P application traces
Bot P2P App Before Overlaying (Bot) After Overlaying (Bot+P2PApp)
# of flows # of DstIPs avg flow size # of flows # of DstIPs avg flow size
Waledac1 Emule1 341784 850 12829 452645 15338 55688
Waledac2 BT2@C 319119 760 11372 361135 1359 348708
Storm1 Limewire1 200237 6390 1342 429458 16635 1714
Storm2 BT3@C 275451 7319 1337 310667 8307 3381
Storm3 Bittorrent2 133955 5584 1344 432464 23261 172945
Storm4 Skype4@C 171471 7277 1280 199101 7520 1266
Storm5 Skype1 164917 6686 1328 214548 13137 1307
Storm6 Ares1 220459 6618 1307 238063 8543 6244
where the P2P bots/applications are running persistently in the underlying hosts. D1
represents the scenario that a host is compromised by a P2P bot and some legitimate
P2P applications are active in the same monitored network.
For D2, we randomly selected half (8) of the P2P bots from NETbots. Then for
each of the 5 P2P applications we ran, we randomly selected one out of its two traces
from NETP2P and overlaid its traffic to the traffic of a randomly selected host from
NETCoC . We further randomly chose 3 P2P hosts from NETP2P@CoC identified in
the first experiment (Section 3.4.3.1). We finally overlaid each of 8 P2P bot traces
to each of the selected 8 P2P traces (5 from NETP2P and 3 from NETP2P@CoC), as
illustrated in the first two columns in Table 20. D2 represents the scenario that a
host, which is compromised by a P2P bot, has an active legitimate P2P application
running at the same time.
We use D′1 to represent a “clean” network, where no host is compromised by P2P
bots. We got D′1 by simply removing all the hosts overlaid with bots’ traces from
NETbots. In order to get D
′
2, we randomly selected hosts compromised by two bots
for each botnet from D2 and discarded the rest of the hosts overlaid by the traces
from NETbots. So D
′
2 represents the scenario in which only two bots from each botnet
exist in the monitored network.
3.4.3 Experimental Results
Table 21 summarizes the experimental results in Section 3.4.3.2, 3.4.3.3 and 3.4.3.4,
where we set the parameters as Θbot = 0.95 and Cntbirch = 4000. The effect of varying
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Table 21: Experimental results
TP FP Data Description
1 100% 0.2% D1 bots overlaid with host
2 100% 0.2% D2 bots overlaid with P2P host
3 100% 0.2% D′2 only two bots
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Figure 18: Number of hosts identified by each processing component
Θbot and Cntbirch is discussed in Section 3.4.3.5.
3.4.3.1 Identifying and Profiling P2P Applications
We applied our detection system on data set D1. The number of hosts kept after
each step is presented in Figure 18. Traffic reduction using DNS traffic significantly
reduced the number of hosts and the number of flows we needed to process, thereby
greatly reducing the workload for the coming steps. For example, as illustrated in
Figure 18, other components only need to process approximately one-third of the
hosts (316 out of 953) after traffic reduction.
Our system identified 34 hosts as P2P clients in total. These 34 hosts are com-
posed of i) all 16 P2P bots, ii) all 10 hosts with 5 popular P2P applications we
have tested, and iii) 8 other hosts in the college networks. For those 8 hosts, 3 are
Bittorrent-related hosts (a.k.a, BT1@C, BT2@C and BT3@C), which have been
verified by the content-based signatures. The remaining 5 identified hosts do not
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Table 22: Fingerprint cluster sum-
maries for 3 Bittorrent clients
Trace Fingerprints
BT1@C
1 1 109 100, UDP
1 1 109 91, UDP
1 1 104 178, UDP
1 1 319 145, UDP
1 1 145 319, UDP
BT2@C
1 1 145 319, UDP
1 1 75 75, UDP
1 1 65 65, UDP
BT3@C 7 6 1118 1767, TCP
Table 23: Fingerprint cluster sum-
maries for 5 potential Skype clients
Trace Fingerprints
Skype1@C
1 1 73 60, UDP
1 1 76 60, UDP
1 1 75 60, UDP
1 1 72 60, UDP
1 1 74 60, UDP
Skype2@C
1 1 75 60, UDP
1 1 74 60, UDP
1 1 76 60, UDP
Skype3@C
1 1 72 60, UDP
1 1 74 60, UDP
1 1 79 60, UDP
1 1 76 60, UDP
Skype4@C 1 1 73 60, UDP
Skype5@C
1 1 74 60, UDP
1 1 75 60, UDP
match any content-based signature. We present their fingerprint cluster summaries
(Pkts, Pktr, Bytes, Byter, proto) in Table 22 and Table 23.
The fingerprint cluster summaries for 3 Bittorrent clients are presented in Ta-
ble 22. For BT1@C and BT2@C, “(1 1 145 319 UDP)” is consistent with one finger-
print cluster of a sample Bittorrent trace described in Table 15. The fingerprint of
BT3@C is different from other two, which may represent another version implemen-
tation of the Bittorrent protocol.
The fingerprint cluster summaries for the remaining 5 unknown P2P hosts are
presented in Table 23. By referring to Table 15, their fingerprint cluster summaries
are very close to those of the Skype trace. For example, “(1 1 75 60, UDP)” is shared
by most of these clients and the sample Skype traffic. This indicates that these 5
hosts are mostly likely Skype clients.
Some fingerprint cluster summaries for Storm and Waledac are presented in Ta-
ble 24. P2P bots in the same botnet exhibit great similarity on fingerprint clusters,
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Table 24: Fingerprint cluster summaries for P2P bots
Trace Fingerprints Trace Fingerprints
Storm1
2 2 94 554, UDP
Storm2
2 2 94 554, UDP
2 2 94 1014, UDP 2 2 94 1014, UDP
2 2 94 278, UDP 2 2 94 278, UDP
. . . . . .
Waledac1
4 3 224 170, TCP
Waledac2
4 3 224 170, TCP
3 3 186 162, TCP 3 3 186 162, TCP
5 4 286 224, TCP 5 4 285 224, TCP
. . . . . .
while their fingerprint clusters are different compared to those of another P2P bot-
net and legitimate P2P applications (e.g., Bittorrent and Skype). We applied our
system on D2 to investigate whether our system can effectively profile different P2P
applications if a bot-compromised host is also running a legitimate P2P application.
Table 25 presents several fingerprint cluster summaries for two bots overlaid with le-
gitimate P2P applications, Waledac2+BT2@C and Storm4+Skype4@C. For the example
of Waledac2+BT2@C, we found that its fingerprint clusters come from two applications,
where “(1 1 145 139, UDP)” and “(1 1 75 75, UDP)” are from Bittorrent protocol
(referring to the second row in Table 22), and “(4 3 224 170, TCP)” together with
“(3 3 185 162, TCP)” are from Waledac (referring to Table 24).
These experimental results demonstrate that our system can effectively identify
hosts engaging in P2P communications. In addition, the generated fingerprint clusters
can effectively profile P2P applications.
3.4.3.2 Detecting P2P Bots
We applied our system on D1 to detect P2P bots. As we discuss in Section 3.4.3.1, the
system identified 34 P2P hosts. By estimating the active time of the P2P application
for each of the 34 hosts, our system identified 31 hosts exhibiting persistent P2P
communications.
For these 31 hosts, our system constructs a hierarchical tree (Figure 19(a)) by
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1 1 145 319, UDP (Bittorrent)
4 3 224 170, TCP (Waledac)
3 3 185 162, TCP (Waledac)
1 1 75 75, UDP (Bittorrent)
. . .
Storm4+Skype4@C
2 2 94 554, UDP (Storm)
2 2 94 1014, UDP (Storm)
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13 Storm Bots 3 Waledac Bots 3 Waledac Bots 13 Storm Bots
(a) On Data Set D1 (bots are not overlaid with legitimate P2P apps) (b) On Data Set D2 (bots are overlaid with legitimate P2P apps)
Θbot ∗ hightmax = 0.47516







Figure 19: Hierarchical tree on persistent P2P hosts
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evaluating the distance (dist(ha, hb) defined in Section 3.3.6) between P2P hosts.
P2P bots share same P2P protocol and have large overlap of the peer IP addresses
in fingerprint clusters, thereby resulting in small distances and dense clusters in con-
sequence. As shown in the Figure 19(a), both Storm and Waledac bots have small
distances to each other and form dense clusters respectively. We cut the tree at
Θbot ∗ heightmax = 0.475 (Θbot = 0.95) to identify dense clusters. As a consequence,
three clusters are identified and therefore a total of 18 hosts were labeled as suspi-
cious. All 16 P2P bots were detected, resulting in a high detection rate of 100% and
a low false positive rate of 0.2% (2/953). The false positives appear to be two Skype
clients. The reason for these two false positives is the conservatively configured value
of Θbot, which is close to 1.
3.4.3.3 Detecting P2P Bots Overlaid with P2P Applications
We applied our detection system on data set D2 to evaluate the detection accuracy
when a bot-compromised host happens to run a legitimate P2P application. Table 20
presents some statistics of the bot traces before and after overlaying legitimate P2P
application traces. Some of bot-compromised hosts’ traffic profiles are significantly
distorted after traffic overlaying. For example, after overlaying BT2@C (a real P2P
client identified in the college network) traffic to the Waledac2 traffic, the average flow
size is increased from 11372 to 348708 and the number of destination IP addresses,
which are involved in the successful outgoing connections, is also increased from
760 to 1359. It is because the Bittorrent application could be actively used for
downloading/uploading files, thereby dominating the traffic profile of the host. In
this case, if we use the traffic profile of the entire host (e.g., the average flow size
and number of destination IP addresses) to detect the bot, the bot behavior will be
concealed by the Bittorrent traffic. As a consequence, the detection approaches
such as [79], which use the traffic profile of the entire host for detection, will lose
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effectiveness.
However, since our system leverages fine-grained information of fingerprint clus-
ters, which describe the profiles of P2P applications instead of entire host, it can
still detect bots even if their underlying hosts are running legitimate P2P applica-
tions. The hierarchical tree for detection is presented in Figure 19(b), where Waledac
bots and Storm bots still form dense clusters. Compared to the hierarchical tree in
Figure 19(a), the tree structure in Figure 19(b) stays stable, which is not affected
by the overlaid legitimate P2P applications. It is because the distance of two bot-
compromised hosts is based on the minimum distance of fingerprint clusters from two
P2P bots, the new fingerprint clusters introduced by the P2P application would not
affect the minimum distance.
In D2, our system identified 26 P2P clients, where 25 out of them exhibit persistent
P2P behaviors. With Θbot = 0.95, we cut the tree at 0.475, and identify three groups of
hosts (18 in total). Among these 18 suspicious hosts, all 16 P2P bots are successfully
identified with a low false positive rate (0.2%). The detection result is not affected
by the overlaid traffic from legitimate P2P applications. This demonstrates that our
system can effectively detect bots even if bot-compromised hosts run legitimate P2P
applications.
3.4.3.4 Detection Performance in Special Cases
It is possible that in the monitored network, only two hosts are compromised by bots
from the same botnet. We applied our system on data set D′2, and achieved the
detection rate of 100% and false positive rate of 0.2%.
It is also possible that the monitored network is “clean”, where no host is com-
promised by P2P bot. In this case, the false positive is a concern. We applied our
system on D′1, which simulates a “clean” network environment, where we get a low
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Figure 20: System performance with different values of CntBirch
3.4.3.5 Analyzing The System Scalability
We optimize the system scalability by designing a two-level clustering-based flow
analysis scheme and distributing workload to achieve parallel computation. Two pa-
rameters are involved respectively, Cntbirch and M . Cntbirch represents the expected
number of sub-clusters from BIRCH. As Cntbirch decreases, the second-level hier-
archical clustering operation will process less sub-clusters and thus achieve better
performance. Figure 20 presents the system running time on a single computation
node as we decrease the value of Cntbirch. By reducing Cntbirch from 10, 000 to 2, 000,
the system performance is improved by 95% (from 50 hours to 2.5 hours). M rep-
resents the number of computation nodes we can use to distribute the workload. As
M increases, each node processes less workload. Figure 21 illustrates the system
running time as we increase M from 1 to 10 (Cntbirch = 4000). We randomly pick
10 hosts to run them in a host to obtain regression model, whose time consumption
is ignorable. For each value of M , we repeat the experiments 5 times and report
the average running time. As demonstrated in the experimental results, distributing
system workload can significantly improve the system performance. For example, the
running time is reduced from 5 hours to 0.69 hours by partitioning the workload to 10
hosts. We also compare our load-balance partition strategy to the random-partition
80
method. As indicated in Figure 21, our design performs better. All of these experi-
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Figure 21: System performance with workload distribution
3.4.3.6 Analyzing The Effect of System Parameters
While the measurement in Section 2.3 motivates the parameter values for Θo and
Θp2p, we study system parameters Θbpg and Cntbirch in this section.
Θbpg is used to identify fingerprint clusters, where each fingerprint cluster is likely
to contain network flows corresponding to the same type of P2P control messages for
a particular P2P application. Therefore, the ideal solution to obtain the Θbpg value
has three steps. First, given the network flows generated by a P2P application, we
perform clustering-based flow analysis in order to obtain flow clusters. Second, we
perform content analysis in order to label as fingerprint clusters those flow clusters
whose flows contain control messages. Finally, we can enumerate the number of dis-
tinct BGP prefixes in each fingerprint cluster and select the minimum value for Θbpg.
While not impossible, such solution suffer from a great practical challenge since it is
practically extremely hard to get all P2P applications, especially P2P bots. There-
fore, in our current system, we estimate the value of Θbpg based on empirical studies.
To be specific, we first run several popular P2P applications (e.g., five applications
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in Table 14), and then perform clustering-based flow analysis. Further, for each ap-
plication, we get the maximum number of BGP prefixes in a cluster, as indicated in
each entry in the Nbgp column in Table 14. Obviously, the Θbpg value should not be
larger than the minimum value, denoted as Bmin (Bmin = 1133 in this specific case),
in the Nbgp column. Otherwise, our system will miss the chance to detect certain P2P
applications. Therefore, the value of Θbpg should fall into the range of [2, Bmin]. Prac-
tically, we tend to obtain a small value in this range, by considering the possibility
that bots may be more stealthy compared to a popular P2P application, thereby con-
tacting a smaller number of peers/networks. However, the side-effect of a small Θbpg
is that it may identify some small clusters, whose flows are not used for P2P control
messages, as fingerprint clusters. Fortunately, such problem could be mitigated by
our system since we investigate the temporal persistence of each fingerprint cluster
and only use persistent fingerprint clusters to evaluate the distance between two P2P
clients. In our current system, we conservatively set Θbpg to be a small value (e.g.,
50) in this range. However, we evaluated different Θbpg values covering a large range
inside [2, Bmin]. Table 26 presents the evaluation results, including the number of
fingerprint clusters, persistent fingerprint clusters, number of detected bots, and false
positives, where Cntbirch = 4000 and Θbot = 0.95. As illustrated in the table, as Θbpg
increases, the number of fingerprint clusters and persistent fingerprint clusters drops.
Particularly, if Θbpg is extremely small (e.g., 2), it may identify many small clusters as
fingerprint clusters and consequently introduce a large number of false positives. For
example, the system generates 13 false positives if we set Θbpg = 2. Similarly, if Θbpg
is too large, it may discard those fingerprint clusters for P2P bots, resulting in a huge
number of false negatives. For example, all bots are missed when Θbpg ≥ 1000. How-
ever, our system has demonstrated it effectiveness over a large range of Θbpg values.
For example, our system achieves great detection performance when Θbpg falls into a
large range of [30, 200]. Such experiment implies that [3.5%Bmin, 40%Bmin] would be
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Table 26: The evaluation of the ΘBGP parameter, Cntbirch = 4000 and Θbot = 0.95
ΘBGP # of fingerprint # of persistent # of detected # of false
clusters fingerprint bots positives
clusters
2 24,185 2,840 16 13
10 3,884 2,445 16 5
20 2,311 1,973 16 5
30 1,709 1,522 16 3
40 1,399 1,268 16 2
50 1,200 1,104 16 2
60 1,069 997 16 2
70 942 879 16 2
80 820 768 16 0
90 724 682 16 0
100 656 621 16 0
150 409 393 16 0
200 305 297 16 0
500 92 91 16 0
800 27 26 9 0
1000 15 14 0 0
1600 12 11 0 0
a feasible configuration.
Cntbirch may introduce a trade-off between system efficiency and effectiveness. For
example, by decreasing Cntbirch, the system has less vectors to process in Hierarchical
clustering and thus increase the system efficiency. However, a small Cntbirch may force
dissimilar flows to be aggregated into the same sub-cluster and therefore into the same
fingerprint cluster, resulting in inaccurate fingerprint clusters. To evaluate Cntbirch,
we conducted the following experiments. We applied our system D2 with different
Cntbirch values, including 2000, 4000, 8000 and 10000. For each Cntbirch value, we
further adopted different Θbot (i.e., 0.1, 0.3..0.95) values to evaluate the detection rate
and false positive rate. The results of detection rate (DR) and false positive (FP)
rate are described in Table 27. The experimental results indicate that the detection
performance is stable over a large range of Cntbirch (e.g., ≥ 4000) and Θbot ∈ [0.7, 0.95]
is a good candidate value. This experiment also suggests that 0.8 or 0.9 may be a
better value for Θbot. This implies that when a labeled data set of P2P botnet traffic
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Table 27: Detection rates and false positive rates for different values of Θbot and
Cntbirch
Θbot
Cntbirch - 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95
2000
DR 0 0 2/16 3/16 16/16 16/16 16/16
FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/953
4000
DR 2/16 3/16 3/16 16/16 16/16 16/16 16/16
FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/953
8000
DR 2/16 3/16 3/16 16/16 16/16 16/16 16/16
FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/953
10000
DR 2/16 3/16 3/16 16/16 16/16 16/16 16/16
FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/953
is available we can tune this threshold (Θbot) to find a better trade-off between false
positives and false negatives.
In summary, our system can effectively detect all the P2P bots with a very low
false positive rate, even if the bot-compromised hosts are running legitimate P2P
applications. Our system is stable over a large range of values for system parameters
and shows great scalability.
3.5 Discussion
For practical deployment, the system can be configured to automatically run daily. In
this case, Argus and dnscap collect flow and DNS data in real-time and our detection
system analyzes the data in batches at the end of each day. The memory consumption
is mainly constrained by the maximum number of flows per host.
If botmasters get to know about our detection algorithm, they could attempt to
modify their bots’ network behavior to evade detection. This situation is analogous
to evasion attacks against other intrusion detection systems. Since our detection algo-
rithm is based on differentiating P2P protocols used by P2P bots from legitimate P2P
applications, botmasters may instruct the bots to join existing legitimate P2P net-
works, and use legitimate P2P networks to propagate commands. The initial version
of Storm adopted this strategy. However, such approach exposes the botnet to sybil
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attacks, where researchers can infiltrate the P2P network and enumerate/detect the
bots [81]. Therefore, current P2P botnet, including Storm and Waledac, isolate their
own P2P network from existing legitimate P2P networks. Botmasters may leverage
our traffic volume reduction component to evade detection. For example, the bot-
master may set up a malicious DNS server, and instruct each bot to query this server
before contacting any peer, asking the malicious DNS server to return a response
containing the peer’s IP address. In this case, our traffic reduction component would
eliminate the corresponding flows from the analysis. To avoid this evasion attempt,
we could filter traffic based only on DNS responses for popular domains, i.e., domains
queried by a non-negligible fraction of hosts in the monitored networks. Bots could
also intentionally try to reduce the number of contacted peer IPs (or BGP prefixes)
or the active time of the bot, in order to bypass the P2P client identification or the
component that detects persistent P2P applications. However, such techniques could
have a serious negative impact on the resiliency of the C&C infrastructure and limit
the usability of the entire botnet. Another evasion approach could exploit the Θp2p
threshold. For example, the P2P bots could exchange traffic for a short period of
time, then go idle for several hours, and repeat this pattern. However, this evasion
technique is equivalent to increasing the churn rate for the P2P nodes, which may
eventually bring to a complete disruption of the overlay network [30]. Bots could also
randomize their P2P communication patterns to prevent our system from getting an
accurate profile of P2P protocols. For example, bots could inject noise into network
flows related to P2P control messages. In this case, we could use other features (e.g.,
the distribution of flow sizes) to profile the P2P protocols. A P2P botnet could also
attempt to reduce the overlap between peers contacted by the bots. For example,
the botnet could partition the peers into different sets and ask each bot to contact
disjoint sets of peers. Such technique may require a lot of efforts for the design and
operation of the P2P botnets. We leave the analysis of such complex botnets to future
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work. We should always strive to develop more robust defense techniques. Combining
different complementary detection techniques to make the evasion harder is one of
the possible directions that we intend to explore in our future work.
3.6 Summary
Detecting botnets in their control-phase is of great importance. In this chapter, we
present a novel botnet detection system that is able to identify botnets with P2P
C&Cs, which represent currently the most robust C&C structures against disruption
efforts. Especially, our system aims to detect all P2P botnets, even in the case
in which their attack behaviors are extremely hard to be observed in the network
traffic. To accomplish this task, we first identify all hosts within a monitored network
that appear to be engaging in P2P communications. Then, we derive statistical
fingerprints of the P2P communications generated by these hosts, and leverage the
obtained fingerprints to distinguish between hosts that are part of legitimate P2P
networks (e.g., file-sharing networks) and P2P bots. We also optimize the scalability
of our system to achieve great efficiency to process a large volume of data. We
have implemented a prototype version of our system, and performed an extensive
experimental evaluation. Our experimental results confirm that the proposed system
can detect stealthy P2P bots with a high detection rate and a low false positive rate,
and also achieves great scalability.
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CHAPTER IV
BOOSTING THE SCALABILITY OF BOTNET
DETECTION SYSTEMS
4.1 Motivation
Due to the severity of botnet threats, botnet detection has attracted intensive research
efforts. As a result, a number of detection systems have been proposed, and most of
them [45, 40, 33, 9, 23, 78, 89, 36] focus on detecting botnets in the control phase.
These systems have demonstrated promising detection results. However, these sys-
tems may suffer from limited scalability when they process a huge volume of network
traffic, which is typical for high-speed and high-volume networks. Their limited scala-
bility mainly stems from their dependence of deep packet inspection (DPI) techniques,
based on which they perform fine-grained analysis on the payload of network packets.
For example, BotHunter [35] uses a payload-based anomaly detector and a signature-
based detection engine. BotSniffer [33] and Rishi [40] need to parse the content of IRC
communications. TĀMD [78] inspects packet payloads to compute content similarity
scores. BotMiner [36] requires DPI to perform activity-plane (A-Plane) monitor-
ing, such as binary downloading and remote exploit detection. Although BotMiner’s
communication-plane (C-Plane) analysis does not require DPI, it suffers from scal-
ability issues that prevents its deployment in high-speed networks (Section 4.4.3.2).
While these systems have shown promising results, because DPI is computationally
expensive, they cannot be directly deployed in high-speed or high-volume networks
without special (usually very expensive) hardware support. Furthermore, even when
special hardware support is available, most of the proposed techniques may still not
be able to keep up with the traffic, due to the relatively high computational cost of
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their traffic analysis algorithms. Load-balancing (i.e., distributing traffic and com-
putation to multiple processing units) may represent a possible solution. However, a
deployment of these systems in load-balancing requires special design and significant
changes to the existing detection algorithms.
In this chapter, we will present our contribution on boosting the scalability of
botnet detection systems. To be specific, we propose a new packet sampling and
scalable spatial-temporal flow correlation approach that aims to efficiently and effec-
tively identify a small number of suspicious hosts that are likely bots. Their traffic
can be forwarded to fine-grained botnet detectors for further analysis. This allows
us to significantly reduce the amount of traffic on which fine-grained analysis such as
DPI is applied. Thus, we boost the scalability of botnet detection for high-speed and
high-volume networks.
Network flow analysis typically requires far fewer resources than DPI. However,
collecting precise network flow information in high-speed networks is challenging, be-
cause we may not be able to afford to process every packet in the network. In order
to solve this problem, packet sampling techniques are commonly employed to reduce
the number of packets to be processed. For example, uniform sampling and its vari-
ant periodic sampling are among the most popular packet sampling techniques, and
they allow a network operator to reconstruct approximate network flow information.
However, their limitation is that they are able to reconstruct relatively precise in-
formation about large flows (i.e., flows that carry a high number of packets), such
as media streaming flows, but may poorly approximate or miss outright information
about small and medium flows. In order to address this issue, some new sampling
algorithms have been recently proposed. For example, FlexSample [14] is a pro-
grammable framework where a network operator can set conditions to increase the
sampling rates packets from specific traffic subpopulations (e.g., packets in small and
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medium flows). Unfortunately, because different botnet implementations may intro-
duce strong diversity in the properties (e.g., flow size) of their C&C communication
flows, it is challenging to set conditions that allow FlexSample to sample packets
targeted for a wide range of botnet C&Cs. For example, flows of HTTP-based C&Cs
are usually small (i.e., short lived) while those related to IRC-based C&Cs are in-
trinsically larger. In order to address this problem, we introduce a new adaptive
sampling technique. Our sampling technique is botnet-aware since it is driven by
intrinsic characteristics of botnets such as group similarity, where the group simi-
larity reflects the fact that bots belonging to the same botnet share similar C&C
communication patterns. We also propose a new scalable spatial-temporal correla-
tion approach to identify hosts that share persistently similar communications. That
is, we aim to identify hosts in a network that persistently share similar communica-
tion patterns for a relatively long (not necessarily continuous) period of time. Our
spatial-temporal flow correlation analysis is motivated by the following observation.
Because of their (illegal) economy-driven nature, botnets are used by the botmasters
for as long as possible to maximize profits (e.g., several months, or until the botnet
is dismantled by law enforcement), so their C&C communications will be active for
a relatively long period of time.
Our work makes the following contributions:
1. We propose a network traffic analysis approach for botnet detection in high-
speed and high-volume networks. The objective of our analysis is to efficiently
and effectively narrow down suspicious hosts that are likely to be bots. The
network traffic generated by these suspicious hosts can then be forwarded to
fine-grained botnet detectors for further analysis.
2. We introduce an adaptive sampling technique based on group similarity, an
intrinsic characteristic of botnets, to sample packets that are likely related to
C&C communications with high probability.
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3. We propose a new scalable spatial-temporal correlation analysis to identify hosts
in a network that share persistently similar communication patterns, which is
one of the main characteristics of botnets.
4. We implemented a proof-of-concept version of our system, and evaluated it us-
ing real-world legitimate and botnet-related network traces. Our experimental
results show that the proposed approach is scalable and can effectively detect
bots with a small number of false positives, which can be further reduced by
fine-grained botnet detection systems.
4.2 Related Work
Researchers have proposed many approaches to detect botnets. Some of the ap-
proaches [23, 89, 9, 40, 45] are designed for detecting botnets with IRC-based C&Cs,
relying on analysis of packet content for detection. Some other detection approaches
are driven by specific attack information (i.e., spam). Ramachandran et al. [12]
used DNSBL to identify bots for spamming, while Zhao et al. used Hotmail logs
in BotGraph [94]. Hu et al. [90] proposed RB-Seeker to detect redirection botnets
based on spam and network flow information. Compared to these approaches, our
system mainly uses packet header and network flow information, indicating a wider
deployment. Some detection algorithms uses correlation approaches. BotHunter [35]
associates IDS events to a pre-defined bot infection dialog model for detection. Bot-
Sniffer [33] leverages the homogeneity of messages and activities to identify botnet
C&Cs. Yen et al. [78] proposed TĀMD to detect bots by aggregating traffic which
shares the same external destination, similar payloads and OS platforms. BotMiner
[36] is a protocol- and structure-independent botnet detection system using clustering
techniques. These systems depend on DPI-based components, which limit their us-
age in high-speed networks. In our system, we design botnet-aware packet sampling
algorithm and scalable spatial-temporal flow correlation approach for efficient and
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effective botnet detection, which aims at the deployment in high-speed networks.
Various sampling algorithms have been proposed to reduce the amount of data
the network devices have to process in high speed networks and infer the traffic statis-
tics based on the sampled packets. Most of them focus on sampling large flows and
improving their estimation accuracy [93]. Recently researchers proposed approaches
to focus on sampling packets in small flows. Kumar et al. [10] and Hu et al. [22] pro-
posed algorithms to sample packets in small flows. However, their overall sampling
rate depends on the Zipfian nature [88] of Internet and thus they cannot achieve a pre-
defined target sampling rate. Ramachandran et al. [14] designed FlexSample, which
can sample packets based on pre-defined conditions. FlexSample can be configured
to capture packets in small/medium flows while keeping a target sampling rate. How-
ever, characteristics of network flows for botnet C&Cs exhibit great diversity among
different botnets and thus it is very challenging to propose good conditions to describe
all the flows of botnet C&Cs. Therefore, these existing sampling algorithms maybe
ineffective to sample packets for botnet C&Cs. In contrast to the above sampling
algorithms, our algorithm is driven by the intrinsic characteristics of botnet C&Cs,




As shown in Figure 22, our botnet detection framework has three components: Flow-
Capture, Flow-Correlation, and Fine-Grained Detector.
The Flow-Capture module aims to monitor the traffic at the edge of high-speed
networks to gather network flow information based on the sampled packets. The
Flow-Capture module is further divided in two components: Packet-Sampling and
































Figure 22: Architectural overview
overall target sampling probability (SRTarget), it samples packets likely related to
botnet C&C communications and delivers them to Flow-Assembler, along with their
corresponding instant sampling probabilities (Section 4.3.2). The Flow-Assembler
assembles sampled packets into raw flows (defined in Section 4.3.2.2).
The Flow-Correlation module groups flows output by Flow-Assembler into C-flows
(defined in Section 4.3.3.1). A C-flow is an abstraction introduced in BotMiner [36] to
represent the C&C communication patterns of potential bots. Each C-flow represents
a view of the communication patterns from a monitored host to a remote service over a
certain epoch (e.g, 12 hours). Flow-Correlation applies a scalable clustering algorithm
over the C-flows to identify hosts that exhibit similar communication patterns towards
machines outside the monitored network. This step is similar to the C-Plane analysis
performed by BotMiner [36], but there are two fundamental differences. First, we use
a significantly more efficient flow clustering process (see Section 4.3.3.2), compared
to BotMiner, which can handle large traffic volumes typical of high-speed networks.
Second, unlike BotMiner, our Flow-Correlation module performs cross-epoch correla-
tion to identify hosts that show persistently similar communication pattens, a telltale
sign of botnets. Any pair of hosts that exhibit persistently similar communication
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patterns will then be labeled as suspicious hosts (potential bots) and delivered to the
Fine-Grained Detector for further in-depth analysis. The Fine-Grained Detector can
then focus on monitoring the packets related to only the suspicious IPs provided by
our Flow-Correlation module, thus reducing the overall cost of the botnet detection
process.
The design and implementation of the Flow-Capture and Flow-Correlation mod-
ules and the detection framework are the main contributions of this work. Existing
DPI-based botnet detectors can be plugged within our framework with little or no
modification to constitute the Fine-Grained Detector module. We developed a Fine-
Grained Detector derived from BotMiner [36] and BotSniffer [33], and we plugged it
into our botnet detection framework. In particular, we used two components: i) an
implementation of the malicious activities detector derived from BotMiner’s A-Plane
monitor, which can identify groups of similar malicious activities based on the attack
features (e.g., the scanned port, the exploits or binary content), and ii) BotSnif-
fer’s IRC-based botnet detection module. Similar to the Cross-Plane correlation in
BotMiner, the correlation component correlates communication patterns and activity
patterns to detect bots. Any pair of IPs that share persistently similar communication
patterns (generated by Flow-Correlation) and similar malicious activities (generated
by the malicious activities detector) are labeled as bots by the correlation component.
And any host identified by the BotSniffer’s IRC-based botnet detection module will
be labeled as bot.
4.3.2 Flow Capture
The Flow-Capture performs packet sampling and reassembles raw flows using a novel
botnet-aware adaptive sampling algorithm, which we call B-Sampling. Our B-Sampling
algorithm leverages the intrinsic characteristic of bots, namely group similarity, to
guide the sampling procedure. Given a pre-defined target sampling rate, B-Sampling
93
Figure 23: The architecture of the packet sampling component
adaptively tunes the instant sampling probabilities for different categories of IPs. For
example, priority will be given to packets related to IPs that share similar commu-
nication patterns, while keeping the overall sampling rate close to the overall target
sampling rate SRTarget. The target sampling rate is usually suggested by the process
capacity of the monitor device and the traffic speed of the monitored network. For
example, the monitor device with capacity of Capdevicebps and the network with the





As described in Figure 23, Packet-Sampling has four components: Counting-Sketch,
Sampling-Sketch, Synchronized IPs Detector (SID), and Priority-based Sampling
Probability Calculation (PSPC). Counting-Sketch tracks the number of packets sent
from a SrcIP to a DstIP. After each time interval of T , Packet-Sampling transfers
the Counting-Sketch to the SID, and then resets the Counting-Sketch to 0 for next
interval. The end of each time interval also triggers the SID and PSPC to identify IP
addresses with synchronized behaviors and recalculate the instant sampling probabil-
ity for each category of IPs. Sampling-Sketch gets the instant sampling probability
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for a packet and decides whether this packet is going to be sampled.
Counting/Sampling Sketch The Counting-Sketch is a table indexed by
Hash(SrcIP ||DstIP ) for TCP and UDP packets, where each entry in the table
is defined as a track-flow. Each entry contains a pair of IPs (SrcIP and DstIP ) and
a counter cnt, which represents the number of packets for this pair of IPs. For TCP
packets, the entry keeps SYN/SYNACK flag. On arrival of a packet, the SrcIP and
DstIP will be recorded and the counter in the corresponding entry will be increased by
1. The Counting-Sketch only handles the packets from internal networks to external
networks. Such design can simplify the system implementation by just monitoring
the separated physical line for outgoing traffic. Moreover, it reduces the time and
memory consumption to access the table. Counting-Sketch is reset to be 0 after the
time interval T (currently 15 minutes).
Each entry in Sampling-Sketch records a category/set of IPs, a counter of packets
related to these IPs, a sampling probability and a priority. On arrival of a packet,
Sampling-Sketch checks the category of this packet based on its SrcIP and DstIP. It
then finds the instant sampling probability (pi) for the corresponding category and
samples this packet with probability pi. The sampled packets, together with their
sampling probabilities, are sent to Flow-Assembler.
Synchronized IPs Detector The SID identifies two kinds of hosts with synchro-
nized behaviors: i) syn-servers: the hosts in external networks whose clients have
similar network behaviors; ii) syn-clients : the hosts in internal networks that share
similar network behaviors to multiple destination hosts.
The detection of syn-servers is motivated by the network behavior of C&C servers
for centralized-based botnets, where their clients (bots) are synchronized and thus
share similar network behaviors. For the legitimate servers, especially the popular
ones, their clients’ behaviors usually diverse from each other due to various usage
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patterns of different users. The detection of syn-clients is motivated by the network
behaviors of P2P-based C&Cs. P2P-based bots usually actively query their peers to
maintain the overlay P2P network for botnet C&Cs. Such behaviors will cause many
similar connections to multiple peer bots.
To detect syn-servers and syn-clients, we introduce “homo-server” and “similar-
client”.
1. Homo-server: We aggregate entries in Counting-Sketch based on each DstIP.
For each DstIP that has at least two SrcIPs, we calculate the variance of the
track-flow sizes. We sort the variances and get the medium value vmedium. For
one DstIP, if its variance vi < vmedium, we mark it as a homo-server. Otherwise,
we take the server as non-homo-server if it has at least two SrcIPs.
2. Similar-clients: We keep an array of bins (denoted as B in Algorithm 3) and
a pre-defined size R (currently R = 10). Each bin bi is represented by its
center that is the average size of track-flows in this bin. For a flow with size
L, if |L − bi.center| ≤ R, we insert this track-flow into bi and then update the
bi.center. Otherwise, we build a new bin and insert this flow into it. In each
bin, if we find a pair of SrcIPs and each of them has more than C (currently
C = 10) flows (e.g., connecting to C different DstIPs), we take this pair of
SrcIPs as similar-clients.
On identifying the syn-clients, we currently discard the TCP and UDP track-
flows with size smaller than 10 to avoid potential false positives generated by popular
network services like DNS or by the scanning-like behaviors. On identifying the
homo-servers, we ignore the TCP track-flows with size of 1 or with only SY NACK
flag. A TCP track-flow with size of 1 indicates an unsuccessful connection. The
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Algorithm 3: Identify Synchronized Hosts
Input: Counting Sketch, Setd, tcur
Output: Setd: Records for syn-clients/servers.
begin
foreach Record R ∈ Setd do
if tcur − R.timestamp ≥ Trec then
Remove R from Setd;
foreach DstIP dhi in the Counting Sketch do
if dhi is homo-server then
Arr.get(dhi).score+ = stepup ;
if Arr.get(dhi).score ≥ THsyn−server then
setd.add(dhi, tcur); Arr.get(dhi).score = THsyn−server;
if dhi is non-homo-server then
Arr.get(dhi).score− = stepdown ;
if Arr.get(dhi).score ≤ THdown then
Arr.get(dhi).score = THdown;
foreach SrcIP shi in the Counting Sketch do
if shi is similar-client then
Arr.get(shi).score+ = stepup ;
if Arr.get(shi).score ≥ THsyn−client then
setd.add(shi, tcur); Arr.get(shi).score = THsyn−client;
else
Arr.get(shi).score− = stepdown ;




flag of SYNACK indicates a TCP connection initiated from external networks, which
is unlikely a connection for botnet C&Cs. Bots usually initiate connections to ex-
ternal C&C servers for two reasons. First, the widely deployed firewall/NAT devices
block the connections initiated from external networks. For example, researchers have
shown that more than 40% storm bots are behind a firewall or NAT [20]. Second,
the dynamic IPs make it very hard for C&C servers to initiate connections to bots
with dynamical IPs accurately.
For each time interval T , we identify the homo-servers and similar-clients. We
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accumulate evidence over multiple intervals to decide whether a host is syn-server or
syn-client. We keep each syn-server and syn-client in the Sampling Sketch for Trec
(currently Trec = E/2, where E is one epoch of 12 hours) from its last update. The
algorithm is described in Algorithm 3. THsyn−server/client is the threshold of the score
to identify syn-server/client. THdown is the lower bound of the score. stepup/down is
the step to increase/decrease the score. We set THsyn−server/client = 4, THdown = −10,
stepup = 1, and stepdown = 0.2. Record represents one data structure for IP and time
stamp. Arr is an array of scores indexed by the hosts and tcur is the time stamp
derived from current packet. If one record in Arr is not updated from its last update
for TArr (currently TArr = E/2), we can eliminate it from Arr.
Algorithm 4: Priority-based Sampling Algorithm
Input: Pt, f1, f2, . . . , fn
Output: p1, p2, . . . , pn
begin
budget = 1;
foreach i = 1 . . . n do








pi = pi > 1?1 : pi;




return {p1, p2, . . . , pn};
end
Sampling Probability Calculation We dynamically calculate the sampling prob-
ability for each category of IPs to fulfill two targets: i) to get as many packets as
possible that are related to syn-clients or syn-servers; ii) to keep the actual sampling
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rate close to the target sampling rate.
To keep the actual sampling rate close to the pre-defined sampling rate, a scheme
for allocating instant sampling probabilities for different categories has been proposed
by Ramachandran et al. [14]. However, this scheme requires pre-configured budgets
for different categories. Inappropriate allocated budgets may affect the packet sam-
pling process. For example, the inadequate budget for synchronized IPs will cause the
lost of packets related to botnet, while the over-allocated budget for synchronized IPs
would be a waste of the resources. To fully utilize the resources to capture packets, we
design a sampling algorithm named Priority-based Sampling Probability Calculation
algorithm. The principle for this algorithm is as follows: under a pre-defined sam-
pling rate, we use the available resources (budget) to capture as many packets in the
first priority category as possible. The remaining available resource will be used to
capture as many packets as possible in the next level priority category. Such process
will continue until there is no further category or no available resource. Algorithm 4
shows this approach. Pt is the pre-defined target sampling rate. {f1, f2, . . . , fn} is
the fraction of packets in each category where priority1 > priority2 · · · > priorityn.
{p1, p2, . . . , pn} is a set of instant sampling rates for different priorities and budget is
for the available budget.
The following equation illustrates how the budget allocation helps the sampling
component to keep a target sampling rate. Suppose there are a total of K packets and
the target sampling rate is Pt. Given n categories and suppose each category has fi
fraction of the total packets and we give budget bi to this category, we can calculate the
sampling probability for category i as pi = Pt
bi
fi
. In this case, the number of sampled
packets Q and overall sampling rate would be Q =
∑n








i=1 bi. According to this equation, as long as
∑n
i=1 bi = 1, the overall sampling
rate Q
K
would be Pt, the target sampling rate. Since fi cannot be obtained precisely in
advance, we dynamically estimate fi using WMA (weighted moving average) based
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i where w1 = 0.2 and w2 = 0.8 in our current design. The system
can dynamically assign priority1 or priority2 to syn-servers or syn-clients. The fewer
the packets related to one of these two categories, the higher priority it has. The
intuition behind such design is to use enough resource to build the accurate flows
for the category that requires least resource. In practice, operators can also fix the
priority or introduce more categories/priorities based on known knowledge (e.g., a
category for the packets that are sent to confirmed bot peers). The packets related
to the rest of IPs are labeled as the lowest priority (priority3).
4.3.2.2 Flow Assembler
The Flow-Assembler assembles sampled packets to generate raw flows, where each
raw flow is identified by 5-tuple key (SrcIP, SrcPort, DstIP, DstPort, Proto). For
TCP flow, the first two handshake packets (SYN and SYNACK ) can be used to
identify the flow direction. However, since packet sampling may result in the loss of
TCP handshake packets, we use following approaches to identify TCP flow direction.
First, if one of these two handshake packets is sampled, we can easily identify the
flow direction. Second, for a TCP flow without TCP handshake packets sampled,
we take this flow as it is initiated from internal networks (e.g., its SrcIP is from
internal network). These approaches guarantee that every TCP flow from internal
network will be attributed to the correct direction. Flow-Assembler outputs a flow if
the flow is finished (e.g., the TCP FIN/RST flag is observed) or it expires (e.g., no
packet comes for this flow for 10 minutes). For one raw flow, we record information
including timeStart, timeEnd, sizeActual (# of packets observed), byteActual (# of bytes
observed) and sizeEst. sizeEst is the estimated flow size based on the sampled packets
and their corresponding instant sampling probabilities. Suppose there are n packets
for one raw flow and each packet has bi bytes and sampling probability of pi, we
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The goal of Flow-Correlation is to identify hosts with persistently similar commu-
nication patterns. By evaluating the capacity of the fine-grained detectors and the
monitored network, operators can estimate the percentage of hosts PerExp (as de-
scribed in Figure 22) that fine-grained detectors can afford to monitor. For example,
if we assume that the traffic is evenly distributed over the hosts in the monitored
network, the capacity of a fine-grained detector (Capdetectorbps) and the network
speed (Capnetworkbps) indicate a PerExp =
Capdetector
Capnetwork
. The Flow-Correlation compo-
nent identifies groups of hosts (up to PerExp) that share most similar communication
patterns and show persistence.
4.3.3.1 Flow Aggregation
We use C-flow to represent the communication pattern from a host to a remote host
and port. We define a C-flow as a set of raw flows sharing same tuple of (SrcIP,
DstIP, DstPort, Proto) in a certain epoch E (currently E = 12hours), denoted as
c = {f1, . . . , fn}. To get C-flows, we filter out the raw flows that satisfy either of two
conditions: i) The raw flow is initiated from external network to internal network,
where the reason is discussed in Section 4.3.2.1. ii) The raw flow has traffic in only
one direction, which indicates an unsuccessful connection. We represent a C-flow
(c = {f1, . . . , fn}) using the following 10 features.
1. The means and variances of fph (the number of flows per hour), ppf (the
number of packets per flow), bpp (the number of bytes per packet), pps (the
number of packets per second), which have similar definition in BotMiner [36].
We use sizeEst to compute ppf and pps, while
byteActual
sizeActual
is used for bpp.
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2. fphmax: the maximum number of flows per hour.
3. timem: the median time interval of two consecutive flows.
4.3.3.2 Cross-Epoch Correlation
Given PerExp, cross-epoch correlation identifies pairs of IPs where each pair shares
persistently similar communication patterns for at least M epochs out of totally N
epochs (M ≤ N).
We get a set (G) of C-flows over multiple epochs, and each C-flow has an epoch-
tag. After clustering C-flows, we get a set of clusters {g1, g2, . . . , gn} where each
cluster gi represents a set of similar communication patterns (G = g1 ∪ g2 ∪ · · · ∪ gn).
For C-flows in one cluster gi, we further aggregate them into different groups (denoted
as {c1i , c
2
i . . . c
N




i · · ·∪c
N
i ) according to their epoch-tags. For example,
cji represents the C-flows that are similar in jth epoch (spatial-similarity). For each
cluster gi, if a pair of SrcIPs share at least M common groups, it indicates that they
share persistently similar communication patterns over at least M epochs. Therefore,
we label this pair of SrcIPs as suspicious. We denote the percentage of all the detected
suspicious IPs over all the SrcIPs as Per. Figure 24 presents an example of cross-
epoch correlation. A/B/C/D is the C-flow associated with the host hA/hB/hC/hD,
and the remote host and port of A/B/C/D are not necessarily to be the same over
multiple epochs (e.g., A represents < hA, hremote, portremote >). Some similar C-flows
associated with hA/hB/hC/hD are clustered together in a cluster gi. By investigating
the epoch-tag related to each C-flow, we aggregate these C-flows to three groups
(c1/c2/c3), as described in the left part of Figure 24. The right part of Figure 24
presents that hA and hB share 3 common groups, which indicates that they share
similar communication patterns for 3 epochs. If we set M ≤ 3, hA and hB are labeled
as suspicious.














Figure 24: An example of cross-epoch-correlation
clustering algorithm. BotMiner uses two-level clustering scheme (X-Means and Hier-
archical) that cannot scale well for large number of C-flows as shown in Figure 26.
To process C-flows in an efficient manner, we use a scalable clustering algorithm
Birch [84]. Given a certain value of “diameter”, Birch can first efficiently discover
clusters of C-flows within such distance. Second, cross-epoch correlation can detect
suspicious IPs based on the clustering results. We repeat these two steps by increasing
the value of “diameter”. This process terminates when the percentage of suspicious
IPs Per for the next step reaches at the expected percentage PerExp or the number
of rounds reaches at a pre-defined MaxRound (currently 50).
4.4 Evaluation
We implemented a prototype system and evaluated it using traces of real-world net-
work traffic and different botnets.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
We mounted our monitors on a span port mirroring a backbone router at the college
network (200Mbps-300Mbps at daytime) to collect data. The traffic covers various
applications and we believe such kind of traffic provides good traces to evaluate our
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Table 28: Background traces
Trace # of Pkts Dur Info
Mar25 205,079,914 12h header
Mar26 280,853,924 24h header
Mar27 318,796,703 24h header
Mar28 444,260,179 24h header
Mar31 102,487,409 1.5h full









system. The dataset contains TCP and UDP headers for continuous 3.5 days and
full packets for 1.5 hours in Table 28. We eliminated a B/16 subnet for dynamic
IPs allocated for wireless connections, which are frequently changed and can not
accurately represent the same hosts for multiple epochs. We observed a total of 1460
different IP addresses in 3.5 days. We also collected 1.5 hour traces with full payload.
We collected the traces of 7 different botnets including IRC-, HTTP- and P2P-
based botnets, as described in Table 29. Bot-IRC-A and Bot-HTTP-A were collected by
running bot instances (“TR/Agent.1199508.A” and “Swizzor.gen.c”) in multiple hosts
in the honeypot. Bot-IRC-B and Bot-HTTP-B/C were generated using Rubot [52], a
botnet emulation framework. In Bot-HTTP-B, bots periodically contacted the C&C
server every 10 minutes. And in Bot-HTTP-C, the bots contacted the C&C server in a
more stealthy way by adding a random time interval between 0 to 10 minutes on each
time of visiting. Both of them conducted scanning attack on receiving the “scan”
command. Bots in Bot-IRC-A send packets much more frequently to C&C server in
the IRC session, resulting in much larger C&C flows compared to Bot-IRC-B. We
collected traces of two P2P-based botnets, Storm [76] and Waledac [37], by running
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binaries in the controlled environment.
After aligning the timestamp of each packet in botnet traces according to the
time of the first packet in background traces, we mixed 3.5 consecutive days of bot-
net traces into the college traces by overlaying them to randomly picked client IPs in
college network. We took one epoch E as 12hr so there are 7 epochs in total. The
filter covers major local DNS, email servers in the college, the IP ranges of the pop-
ular service networks (e.g., MICROSOFT, GOOGLE, YAHOO, SUN, etc.), popular
content distribution networks (e.g., AKAMAI) , whose IP ranges are unlikely to be
used for Botnet C&Cs, and IPs of top 10, 000 alexa domains (corresponding to 12230
IPs).
4.4.2 Experimental Design
We structured our experiments in three parts.
First, we will study the effectiveness of our sampling algorithm. To be specific, we
will investigate whether the actual sampling rate achieved by our sampling algorithm
is close to the pre-defined target sampling rate. We will also present packet sampling
rates for those packets that are generated by botnets.
Second, we will study the effectiveness of the cross-epoch correlation method.
Particularly, we will show the scalability of the correlation method, and evaluate its
effectiveness together with the packet sampling algorithm.
Finally, we will investigate the percentage of packets that fine-grained botnet
detectors need to perform DPI-based analysis by using our traffic analysis framework.




4.4.3.1 Evaluation of Sampling Algorithm
We evaluated B-Sampling algorithm using the mixed traces with different target sam-
pling rates (0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075 and 0.1). We further perform comparison with
following popular sampling algorithms:
1. FlexSample [14]: FlexSample is a state-of-the-art sampling algorithm that can
be configured with different “conditions” for different purposes. FlexSample
used a specific condition illustrated in Table 30 (Figure 10 in FlexSample [14]) to
capture botnet packets by allocating the majority of budgets to packets related
to “servers with high indegree of small flows”. However, since the number of
infected machines could be small in real-world, the “high fan-in” feature may not
hold and thus will probably miss the botnet packets. As illustrated in Table 31,
this condition causes very low sampling rates on botnet packets in our traces.
Therefore, we modify the condition and only use the condition related to flow
size for FlexSample. We configured FlexSample using a condition presented in
Table 30 with (size ≤ 20, budget = 0.95), which means that FlexSample uses
95% resource to capture the packets in flows with sizes smaller than 20.
2. Sketch Guided Sampling [10]: Sketch Guided Sampling (SGS) algorithm lever-
ages a sketch for sampling, where each entry in the sketch keeps the number of
packets observed for this flow. The sampling rate for a packet, which belongs to
a flow with size s, is f(s) = 1
1+ǫ2s(2α−1)
. According to this formula, SGS enables
higher sampling rates for packets belonging to small flows (e.g., s is small),
which is similar to FlexSample. However, in contrast to B-Sampling, FlexSam-
ple, Random Sampling, and Periodic Sampling, SGS cannot maintain a target
sampling rate. Its actual sampling rate heavily depends on the distribution of
the flow size. For example, if the flow size follows Zipfian distribution, where
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Table 30: Condition for FlexSample
vars = 1
conditions = 1
var 1 := srcip.srcport.dstip.dstport.prot
var 1 in (0, 20]: 0.95
Table 31: Packet sampling rates using condition in Figure 10 in FlexSample [14]
SRT SRI−A/B SRH−A/B/C SRStorm SRWaledac
0.025 0.003/0.01 0.013/0.011/0.01 0.006 0.008
0.05 0.006/0.018 0.023/0.019/0.017 0.012 0.015
large flows carry the vast majority of packets, the actual sampling rate will be
low. In our experiment, we use the same parameter values in [10], where ǫ = 0.1
and α = 1.
3. Random Sampling: Random sampling algorithm is a widely deployed sampling
algorithm. It gives each packet with probability r (r is the predefined sampling
rate), and therefore it can well approximate the pre-defined target sampling
rate. Periodic sampling algorithm is a variant of random sampling algorithm.
Instead of sampling each packet with sampling rate of r, it samples the nth
packet, where n = 1
r
.
The experimental results for B-Sampling, FlexSample, SGS, and random sampling
algorithms are presented in Table 32, Table 33, Table 34, and Table 35, respectively.
The analysis of experimental results is discussed as follows:
1. In each table, the first column (SRT ) reports pre-defined target sampling rates
and the second column (SRActual) presents the actual sampling rates achieved
by each sampling algorithm. According to the results, B-Sampling, FlexSample,
random sampling, and periodic sampling algorithm can keep the actual sampling
rates close to the target sampling rates. The actual sampling rates from B-
Sampling algorithm are a little higher compared to the target sampling rates.
It is mainly due to the fact that we set the time interval, which we used to tune
the instant sampling rates for different categorizes, is large (e.g., 15 minutes).
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Table 32: Packet sampling rates for B-Sampling
SRT SRActual SRIRC−A/B SRHTTP−A/B/C SRStorm SRWaledac
0.01 0.012 0.65/0.68 0.55/0.69/0.68 0.02 0.02
0.025 0.027 0.93/0.92 0.72/0.93/0.93 0.16 0.18
0.05 0.052 0.96/0.96 0.74/0.96/0.96 0.48 0.48
0.075 0.076 0.97/0.97 0.75/0.97/0.97 0.72 0.7
0.1 0.1 0.98/0.98 0.76/0.98/0.98 0.83 0.81
Table 33: Packet sampling rates for FlexSample
SRT SRActual SRIRC−A/B SRHTTP−A/B/C SRStorm SRWaledac
0.01 0.01 0.001/0.07 0.06/0.07/0.06 0.05 0.07
0.025 0.025 0.002/0.16 0.16/0.17/0.16 0.11 0.16
0.05 0.05 0.004/0.32 0.32/0.35/0.33 0.23 0.33
0.075 0.075 0.006/0.48 0.50/0.50/0.48 0.33 0.48
0.1 0.1 0.008/0.6 0.6/0.64/0.61 0.41 0.61
So the actual sampling rates for B-Sampling algorithms can be closer to the
target sampling rates by further reducing such time interval. SGS algorithm
is not adaptive, and hence it cannot maintain a pre-defined sampling rate.
As presented in the second column in Table 34, SGS results in a high actual
sampling rate (20%) in our monitored network.
2. The remaining columns report the sampling rates related to different types of
botnet-related packets, where we “zoom” in the sampled packets and evaluate
the actual sampling rates for packets of each botnet. For example, the column of
SRIRC−A/B reports the actual sampling rates for packets in Bot-IRC-A and Bot-
IRC-B using different sampling algorithms. We can find that B-Sampling cap-
tures a higher percentage of botnet packets, compared to FlexSample, and ran-
dom sampling algorithms. For example, considering the second row (target sam-
pling rate is 0.025), B-Sampling achieves a sampling rate of 0.93 (SRIRC−A/B, B
column) while FlexSample achieves that of 0.002 (SRIRC−A/B, F lex column) for
packets in Botnet-IRC-A, where the C&C flows are large flows. The remaining
columns report a comparison of B-Sampling and FlexSampling on the sampling
rates for other botnets. As we can see, B-Sampling achieves higher sampling
rate for botnet-related packets, compared to other sampling algorithms. The
reason is that the feature of flow size and server in-degree are not intrinsic for
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Table 34: Packet sampling rates for SGS
SRT SRActual SRIRC−A/B SRHTTP−A/B/C SRStorm SRWaledac
- 0.2 0.007/0.093 0.96/0.96/0.96 0.58 0.89
Table 35: Packet sampling rates for the random sampling algorithm
SRT SRActual SRIRC−A/B SRHTTP−A/B/C SRStorm SRWaledac
0.01 0.01 0.01/0.01 0.01/0.01/0.01 0.01 0.01
0.025 0.025 0.025/0.025 0.025/0.025/0.025 0.025 0.025
0.05 0.05 0.05/0.05 0.05/0.05/0.05 0.05 0.05
0.075 0.075 0.075/0.075 0.075/0.075/0.075 0.075 0.075
0.1 0.1 0.1/0.1 0.1/0.1/0.1 0.1 0.1
botnets and different botnets can diverse greatly regarding these features. Ran-
dom sampling algorithms cannot focus on capturing packets that are likely to
be related to botnets, and therefore they give the same sampling probability to
all packets.
We evaluated the parameters, C and stepup, in the B-Sampling algorithm in Sec-
tion 4.3.2.1. Given SRT = 0.05, we report the experimental results in Table 36. The
results demonstrate that the results of B-Sampling are stable over these values.
Table 36: Packet sampling rates using different parameters
C, stepup SRActual SRI−A/B SRH−A/B/C SRStorm SRWaledac
10, 0.8 0.051 0.97/0.96 0.71/0.96/0.96 0.50 0.49
10, 0.5 0.051 0.96/0.95 0.61/0.96/0.95 0.51 0.51
10, 1.2 0.052 0.96/0.96 0.77/0.96/0.96 0.46 0.46
5, 1 0.052 0.96/0.96 0.74/0.96/0.96 0.46 0.46
15, 1 0.052 0.96/0.96 0.74/0.96/0.96 0.48 0.48
4.4.3.2 Evaluation of Flow Correlation
In this section, we will evaluate the detection accuracy and scalability of our cross-
epoch correlation technique. We set M = xN
2
y (N = 7, M = 3), which means that
two hosts sharing similar communication patterns for any 3 out of 7 epochs will be
labeled as suspicious.
Given SRT and PerExp, each cell in Table 37 shows the detection rate of bots(/23)
and percentage of noises(/1460) identified by Flow-Correlation using B-Sampling.
The results show that Flow-Correlation can achieve high detection rate with low
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Figure 25: The average detection rate for cross-epoch correlation, over different
values of PerExp
PerExp. For example, with PerExp ≥ 5%, for all the SRT evaluated, Flow-Correlation
can successfully identify all the bots. While for the very low PerExp (e.g., 2% and 3%),
more than half of the bots were still captured. We also compared the detection rate
of Flow-Correlation using B-Sampling to that of Flow-Correlation using FlexSample
(in Table 38). The comparison results for using B-Sampling algorithm and using the
random sampling algoirithm is presented in Table 39. Figure 25 illustrates the average
detection rates over different PerExp for each target sampling rate. The comparison
results show that by using B-Sampling, Flow-Correlation can achieve higher detection
rate compared to both FlexSample and the random sampling algorithm.
Figure 26 presents the time consumption (in a 4G memory and 2-core CPU com-
puter) for cross-epoch correlation and the C-Plane clustering of BotMiner as the num-
ber of C-flows increases. We configured Birch to run MaxRound = 50 to simulate the
process of identifying up to PerExp suspicious hosts. The exponential time increment
for C-Plane clustering of BotMiner indicates its limited scalability. The cross-epoch
correlation shows linear pattern and its linear regression model is t = 0.0035x.
Figure 27 presents the mean and standard deviation for detection rates by Flow-
Correlation with B-Sampling for different M , given PerExp (5% or 10%) for all SRT .
First, the results demonstrate the effectiveness of cross-epoch correlation. When no
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Table 37: Detection rates of cross-epoch correlation using B-Sampling
SRT For each PerExp, TP(bots/23), FP(noises/1460)
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0.01 48%, 0.1% 83%, 0.5% 96%, 1% 96%, 2% 100%, 3% 100%, 4% 100%, 5% 100%, 6% 100%, 6% 100%, 8%
0.025 52%, 0% 87%, 0.5% 100%, 1% 100%, 2% 100%, 3% 100%, 4% 100%, 5% 100%, 6% 100%, 7% 100%, 8%
0.05 48%, 0.1% 100%, 0.3% 100%, 1% 100%, 2% 100%, 3% 100%, 4% 100%, 5% 100%, 5% 100%, 7% 100%, 7%
0.075 48%, 0.2% 100%, 0.3% 100%, 1% 100%, 2% 100%, 3% 100%, 4% 100%, 5% 100%, 6% 100%, 7% 100%, 8%
0.1 39%, 0.3% 78%, 0.8% 100%, 1% 100%, 2% 100%, 3% 100%, 3% 100%, 5% 100%, 5% 100%, 7% 100%, 8%
1 30%, 0.5% 65%, 0.8% 96%, 1% 100%, 2% 100%, 3% 100%, 4% 100%, 5% 100%, 5% 100%, 7% 100%, 8%
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Table 38: Detection rates of cross-epoch correlation using FlexSample
SRT For each PerExp, TP(bots/23), FP(noises/1460)
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0.01 22%, 0.6% 30%, 2% 30%, 2% 39%, 3% 52%, 4% 52%, 5% 52%, 6% 52%, 7% 52%, 8% 52%, 8%
0.025 22%, 0.6% 39%, 1% 52%, 2% 87%, 3% 87%, 3% 87%, 5% 87%, 6% 87%, 7% 87%, 7% 87%, 8%
0.05 17%, 0.6% 43%, 1% 70%, 2% 87%, 3% 87%, 4% 87%, 4% 87%, 5% 87%, 7% 87%, 7% 87%, 7%
0.075 30%, 0.4% 57%, 1% 83%, 2% 87%, 3% 87%, 3% 87%, 4% 87%, 6% 96%, 6% 96%, 7% 96%, 8%
0.1 22%, 0.3% 65%, 1% 83%, 2% 96%, 2% 96%, 3% 100%, 4% 100%, 5% 100%, 6% 100%, 7% 100%, 8%
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Table 39: Detection rates of cross-epoch correlation using the random sampling algorithm
SRT For each PerExp, TP(bots/23), FP(noises/1460)
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0.01 13%, 0.6% 13%, 1% 22%, 2% 22%, 3% 22%, 4% 22%, 5% 22%, 6% 22%, 7% 35%, 8% 35%, 9%
0.025 17%, 0.7% 30%, 1% 30%, 2% 30%, 3% 39%, 4% 39%, 5% 39%, 6% 43%, 7% 43%, 8% 43%, 9%
0.05 22%, 0.6% 34%, 1% 40%, 2% 40%, 3% 40%, 4% 52%, 5% 52%, 6% 52%, 7% 52%, 8% 52%, 9%
0.075 22%, 0.6% 26%, 1% 43%, 2% 52%, 3% 52%, 4% 52%, 5% 52%, 6% 52%, 7% 52%, 8% 52%, 9%
0.1 17%, 0.7% 43%, 1% 52%, 2% 52%, 3% 52%, 4% 52%, 5% 52%, 6% 52%, 7% 52%, 8% 52%, 9%
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Figure 26: Scalability of cross-epoch correlation
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Figure 27: The average detection rate (over SRT s) of cross-epoch correlation using
B-Sampling
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Table 40: Detection rates of fine-grained detectors
SRT For each PerExp, TP(bots/23), FP(noises/1460)
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0.01 48%, 0 83%, 0 96%, 0 96%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0
0.025 52%, 0 87%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0
0.05 48%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0
0.075 48%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0
0.1 39%, 0 78%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0
1 30%, 0 65%, 0 96%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0 100%, 0
cross-epoch correlation is used (M = 1), many legitimate IPs show stronger similarity
than bots in a single epoch. Therefore, given a certain PerExp, more than 50% bots
are missed. While cross-epoch correlation can effectively eliminate these legitimate
IPs that show strong similarity in one epoch but do not have persistently similar
patterns. For example, cross-epoch correlation with M = 2 can successfully detect
most bots. Second, the results indicate that cross-epoch correlation is not sensitive
to the value of M . For example, for M = 3/4/5, the cross-epoch correlation achieves
similar detection rate. Such observation also indicates that N
2
is a good value for M .
4.4.3.3 Botnet Detection
Fine-grained botnet detector inspects all the packets related to suspicious IPs detected
by Flow-Correlation. Using 1.5hr trace mixed with botnet traces, we evaluated the
detection rate and performance of the fine-grained detector.
By analyzing the similarity among IRC messages, “IRC Message Correlation”
component in our detector detected bots in Bot-IRC-A/B. Other bots were detected
by the “Correlation” component. For example, Bots in Bot-HTTP-B/C trigger alerts
when they scan the local network. Bot-HTTP-A bots trigger alerts when they make
update requests. Storm and Waledac trigger alerts when they discover peers. These
bots were detected by correlating such activities/alerts with corresponding pairs of
IPs from Flow-Correlation. Table 40 presents the detection rates and false positive
rates for the fine-grained detector for different SRT s and PerExps. The corresponding
cells in Table 42 present the percentage of packets that our fine-grained detector needs
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Table 41: Performance of fine-grained detector (in seconds)
With Flow-Corr (PerE = 5%, M = 3) direct
SRT 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.1 1
Per of Pkts 1.7% 2.9% 2.1% 3% 4.3% 2% 100%
T ime 33s 39s 35s 40s 49s 33s 858s
to inspect. For most combinations of SRT and PerExp, our framework can reduce
traffic volume by more than 90% for fine-grained detector but still keep high detection
rates and low false positives. For example, for SRT = 0.01 and PerExp = 0.05, the
fine-grained detector can detect all bots with false positive of 0, and it only needs to
focus on 1.7% percentage of packets.
Table 41 presents the performance comparison, including the percentage of packets
inspected and the processing time of the fine-grained detector in two situations: i)
the detector is directly applied, ii) the detector is applied with Flow-Correlation and
B-Sampling (PerExp = 0.05 and M = 3). By using Flow-Correlation, fine-grained
detector to reduce 95% time to process off-line traces, indicating a great workload
reduction in real time.
Table 42: The percentage of packets investigated by fine-grained detectors based on
DPI
SRT For each PerExp, Percentage of Packets
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0.01 0.1% 0.4% 1% 1.5% 1.7% 3.3% 3.5% 4.1% 4.2% 5%
0.025 0.2% 0.7% 1.2% 2.6% 2.9% 3.5% 3.8% 4% 4.2% 6%
0.05 0.6% 0.6% 1% 1.8% 2.1% 2.2% 2.7% 2.7% 3.3% 3.5%
0.075 0.6% 0.6% 2% 3% 3.2% 3.8% 4.5% 4.5% 4.4% 5%
0.1 0.2% 0.9% 1.3% 3.7% 4.3% 4.3% 4.6% 4.6% 5.5% 6.2%
1 0.7% 0.6% 1% 1.7% 1.9% 3.4% 3.3% 3.3% 4.9% 6.1%
4.5 Discussion
To answer the question “how high speed networks our approach can handle?”, we
consider the performance of two key components, B-Sampling and cross-epoch corre-
lation. B-Sampling is intended to be implemented with hardware support, where we
can design the Counting-Sketch and Sampling-Sketch in fast memory (e.g., SRAM)
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while the SID and PSPC in slow memory (e.g., DRAM). The system can periodi-
cally but parallel read the data from SRAM to DRAM for identifying synchronized
hosts and computing sampling probabilities, and then write the sets of IPs to SRAM.
And for Counting-Sketch, recent study has shown the hardware implementation of
a specific hash function with a throughput of over 10Gbps [19], indicating the po-
tential performance of 10Gbps of B-Sampling with hardware implementation. Given
an expected time consumption of 2hr for cross-epoch correlation, the linear model
t = 0.0035x (in seconds) implies 2M C-flows. If we assume the number of C-flows is
proportional to the traffic volume (e.g., 200K C-flows in our experiment is correspond-
ing to 200Mbps), 2M C-flows correspond to a network with speed of 2Gbps. Since
2Gbps is less than the potential performance of 10Gbps of B-Sampling, such results
indicate that our approach can be used in 2Gbps networks (e.g., campus backbone
networks) and has the potential to be deployed in faster network as the expected time
consumption of cross-epoch correlation increases.
Because of our assumptions on the persistent use of coordinated C&Cs in a botnet,
any evasion attempts that violate our assumptions will likely succeed if the botmaster
knows our algorithms, similar to any evasion attacks against an IDS. Bots may inten-
tionally manipulate their communication patterns to decrease sampling probabilities
or evade cross-epoch correlation. For example, bots can randomize communication
patterns (e.g., number of packets per flow) to evade the syn-client/server detection.
One potential solution is to dynamically tune the parameters used for identifying syn-





value of variances for identifying syn-server, and choose R and C from a pre-defined
set of values/ranges for identifying syn-clients). Another solution is for B-Sampling
to incorporate information from other systems. For example, we can set a category of
IPs in rouge networks [16] or malicious fast-flux networks, which are likely related to
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botnets, to sample more related packets. For cross-epoch correlation, we can incor-
porate more detection features (e.g., using packet payload information for some tight
clusters to do light-weight content checking) to make the evasion more difficult. Due
to the nature of the arms race in existing intrusion detection and evasion practice,
we should always study better and more robust techniques as a defender. Combining
different complementary detection techniques to make the evasion harder is one pos-
sible future direction. We leave a deeper and more extensive study to handle these
evasion attempts as future work.
4.6 Summary
Botnet detection in high-speed and high-volume networks is a challenging problem.
Given the severity of botnets and the growing interest from ISPs to defend against
botnets, research on botnet detection in high-speed and high-volume networks is
important. In this chapter, we have described a solution to this problem, which
includes a botnet-aware adaptive packet sampling algorithm and a scalable spatial-
temporal flow correlation approach. The adaptive packet sampling technique uses
network characteristics of botnet C&Cs to capture more packets related to bots and
adaptively tune the sampling probabilities to keep a target sampling rate. The flow
correlation approach exploits the essential properties of botnets and detects bots
by identifying hosts with persistently similar communication patterns. Evaluation
using real-world network traces shows that our proposed solution yields good per-
formance. The sampling algorithm can capture more botnet packets in comparison
to pre-defined sampling rate and outperforms the state-of-the-art adaptive sampling
algorithms. Based on the sampled packets, the correlation algorithm can successfully
and scalably pinpoint various types of bots (including IRC-based, HTTP-based, and
P2P-based). This approach will help the fine-grained botnet detectors to focus on
inspecting packets from a smaller amount of suspicious traffic, thus allowing them to
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operate on increasingly more high-speed networks.
119
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
Serving as platforms responsible for the vast majority of large-scale and coordinated
cyber attacks, botnets have been recognized as one of the most serious threats against
Internet security. Botnet detection therefore becomes fundamentally important. A
number of network-based botnet detection systems have been consequently proposed.
However, these systems are faced with two new challenges, which may significantly
limit their practical use. First, botnets tend to be increasingly stealthy on performing
cyber attacks. As a result, botnet detection systems that rely on the observation of
attacks in network traffic may lose their effectiveness. Second, the volume of net-
work traffic grows fast, requiring botnet detection systems to process a huge amount
of information efficiently. However, existing botnet detection systems mainly rely
on deep packet inspection for detection, thereby suffering from limited scalability.
My dissertation focuses on addressing these two challenges by buidling three novel
systems.
First, we have designed a system, named ARROW [47], to detect drive-by down-
load attacks, which represent one of the most significant and popular methods for
botnet infection. ARROW boosts the effectiveness of existing detection systems by
detecting a large number of stealthy drive-by download attacks that are missed by
them. By designing this system, we made the following contributions:
• We provide a method to identify malware distribution networks from millions
of individual drive-by download attacks.
• By correlating individual drive-by download attacks, we propose a novel method
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to generate regular expression signatures of central servers of malware distribu-
tion networks to detect drive-by downloads.
• We have built a system to automatically generate regular expression signatures
of central servers of MDNs and evaluate the effectiveness of these signatures.
The next piece of our work concentrates on building system to detect P2P botnets.
Our system aims to effectively detect P2P botnets, even in the case that their attacks
cannot be observed in the network traffic. Our system is also capable of detecting
P2P botnets even if the bot-infected hosts are running legitimate P2P applications
simultaneously. Our work made multiple contributions:
• We propose a novel flow-clustering-based analysis approach to identify and pro-
file hosts that are engaging in P2P communications.
• We design new features and algorithms to detect P2P botnets independent of
the observation of botnets’ malicious activities.
• We have developed a scalable detection system based on efficient clustering
algorithm and load-balance workload distribution. We also evaluate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of our system.
The third piece of our work focuses on boosting the scalability of existing network-
based botnet detection systems. Our system can effectively and efficiently identify a
small portion of hosts that are likely to be bots, and then suggest existing detection
systems to perform DPI-based analysis on packets related to those suspicious hosts
instead of all hosts. Consequently, the existing detection systems only need to inves-
tigate a small portion of network traffic and their scalability is thus boosted. In this
piece of work, we made the following contributions:
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• We introduce a botnet-aware adaptive packet sampling technique based on
group similarity, an intrinsic characteristic of botnets, to sample packets that
are likely related to C&C communications with high probability.
• We propose a new scalable spatial-temporal correlation method to identify hosts
in a network that share persistently similar communication patterns, which is
one of the main characteristics of botnets.
• We have implemented a proof-of-concept version of our system, and evaluated
it using real-world legitimate and botnet-related network traces. Our experi-
mental results show that the proposed approach is scalable and can effectively
detect bots with few false positives, which can be further reduced by fine-grained
botnet detection systems.
5.2 Future Work
While a number of problems to build effective and scalable network-based botnet
detection systems have been addressed in this dissertation, our research work also
suggested new research directions discussed as follows:
• Botnet Detection Based on Heterogeneous Information Correlation
The severity of cyber-attacks has accelerated the deployment of various de-
tection and monitoring systems, such as antivirus software, DNS monitoring
system, network flow collection system, and spam traps. A growing body of
information collected from diverse systems makes possible the opportunity to
study and detect botnets from multiple perspectives. Therefore, building an in-
tegrated detection system that can correlate information from these monitoring
systems is a promising direction. However, it is a challenging task because of
the heterogeneous nature and sheer volume of the information. We believe our
work on leveraging DNS and network flow for P2P botnet detection (Chapter 3)
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and designing scalable botnet detection systems (Chapter 4) will provide useful
information to explore this direction.
• Botnet Mitigation A natural step after botnet detection is mitigation. How
to strike the balance between minimizing the botnet threats and maintaining the
usability of bot-infected hosts remains a challenging problem. Designing novel
mitigation techniques that can integrate mitigation strategies from different
levels (e.g., process, system, and network) would be a promising direction.
• Botnet Detection in Emerging Infrastructures Driven by incredible prof-
its, attackers are always actively expanding their malicious ecosystems by con-
taminating emerging infrastructures. A number of botnets that operate on
smart phones have been identified, introducing great threats against personal
data and cellular networks. Stuxnet [63], a bot targeted industrial control sys-
tems, was identified in 2009 and reportedly interfered with the operation of
Iran’s nuclear facility. As a consequence, leveraging our knowledge learnt from
detecting bontets in Internet to proactively defeat botnets and other malware
in emerging infrastructures will demonstrate great importance and deserves ex-
ploration in the future.
5.3 Closing Remarks
This dissertation addressed important research problems in botnet detection. Specif-
ically, our work focused on addressing new challenges presented to existing botnet
detection systems, which are introduced by the evolution of both botnets and the
Internet. We first built a novel system to detect drive-by downloads, which serve as
the primary way for botnet infection. Further, we proposed a new P2P botnet detec-
tion system. We finally presented a new traffic analysis framework that can boost the
scalability of existing botnet detection systems. Together, our contributions boost the
effectiveness and scalability of existing botnet detection systems. Due to the nature
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of arms race in existing security area, attackers and their attacks are always actively
evolving, which requires us to identify and act on emerging challenges. We believe
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